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HomeMy WebLinkAbout1998-06-08 City CouncilCity of Palo Alto City Manager’s Report 21 TO:HONORABLE CITY COUNCIL FROM:CITY MANAGER DEPARTMENT: CITY MANAGER DATE:JUNE 8, 1998 CMR: 232:98 SUBJECT: FEBRUARY 2-3, 1998 FLOOD POST-INCIDENT CRITIQUE REPORT IN BRIEF On February 2-3, 1998, a major storm hit Palo Alto, resulting in an unprecedented level of flooding. The City estimates it will incur more than $2 million in flood-related expenses, including emergency response, repair of damaged public property and recovery assistance to residents. The severity of the storm prompted a Presidential Declaration of Emergency for Palo Alto and other Bay Area cities. This report is an internal post-incident critique which describes the events of the February 2-3 flood in Palo Alto and reviews the policies and procedures followed by City staff in response to the flood. An external review will also be conducted. The intent of the report is not to address infrastructure issues, such as long-term creek management. Rather, the report’s purpose is to identify opportunities for the City to improve its.emergency response .capabilities. Toward that end, the report outlines several findings and makes several recommendations. Although the City successfully provided a range of services to the community during and after the flood, there are several opportunities for improvement. These opportunities include: information systems; disaster notification; public education; internal training; equipment/supplies; information and referral; and volunteer coordination. This report recommends that Council approve the attached Budget Amendment Ordinance in the amount of $172,000 to create a new Capitol Improvement Program (CIP) project for an Emergency Notification System and direct staff to. include $228,000 in the 1998-99 budget to upgrade the Emergency Operation Center (EOC). The report also recommends that Council direct staff to address the areas for improvement identified herein in an addendum to the proposed Emergency Management Plan (transmitted to Council with CMR: 270:98). This addendum will be developed to outline the City’s future response to floods and other emergencies and will describe the resources and programs that will be put in place to implement various elements of the Emergency Management Plan. CMR:232:98 Page 1 of 17 RECOMMENDATION Staff recommends that Council approve the attached Budget Amendment Ordinance in the amount of $172,000 to create a new Capitol Improvement Program (CIP) project for an Emergency Notification System and direct staffto include $228,000 in the 1998-99 budget to upgrade the Emergency Operation Center (EOC). Staff further recommends that Council direct staff to come back to Council with an addendum to the proposed Emergency Management Plan that addresses the areas for improvement identified in this report: information systems; public education; internal training; equipment/supplies; information and referral; and volunteer coordination. BACKGROUND Rainfall and Creek Flow: February_ 2-3. 1998 On Monday, February 2, a large and intense Pacific storm, driven by the E1 Nino weather system, struck the San Francisquito Creek watershed. This watershed is a 45 square mile area that includes a portion of Palo Alto and extends from the ridge of the Santa Cruz Mountains down to the bay (see attached watershed map). Between 6 a.m. on February 2 and 6 a.m. on February 3, 4.5 inches of rain were measured at the Santa Clara Valley Water ¯District precipitation gauge above Foothills Park. Rainfall was particularly intense between 10 p.m. and midnight. Because the ground had been saturated by a series of previous storms, even the undeveloped portions of the watershed were unable to absorb much of the rainfall. The result was increased runoff into local creeks and a heightened threat of flooding. The level of San Francisquito Creek rose precipitously between midnight and 1 a.m. on February 3, resulting in flash flooding in Palo Alto, Menlo Park and East Palo Alto. According to estimates by the Santa Clara Valley Water District, San Francisquito Creek downstream of Middlefield Road has the capacity to convey approximately 6,000 cubic feet per second (cfs); downstream of Highway 101, creek capacity is reduced to approximately 3,000 cfs. The peak flow in San Francisquito Creek occurred shortly after 1 a.m. on February 3. Preliminary calculations by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) found that, during the early hours of February 3, the creek was flowing at up to 7,100 cfs at the USGS stream gauge at Stanford Golf Course, upstream ofJunipero Serra Boulevard. This rate is the highest ever recorded at this gauge since it was installed in 1930. It is likely that the flow was even greater downstream due to the contribution of additional runoff into the creek from local storm drains. For comparison purposes, creek flow during the 1955 flood in Palo Alto was 5,560 cfs; the one percent (100 year flood) flow rate at this location is projected by the Federal Emergency Management Agency to be 7,860 cfs (see attached graph). CMR:232:98 Page 2 of 17 Description of Flooding in Palo Alto: February. 2-3.1998 There were two primary sources of flooding as a result of the February 2-3 storm. The most significant flooding resulted from the overtopping of San Francisquito Creek. There were no levee breaches or significant debris blockages in the creek. None of the other creeks in the city overtopped their banks. In addition to the flooding from San Francisquito Creek, the heavy rains caused some storm drains to back-up, resulting in localized ponding and basement flooding. A map of flooding from San Francisquito Creek is included as attachments to this report. From a windshield survey conducted immediately after the flood, it is estimated that approximately 400 homes sustained flooding above the finished floor line, resulting in an estimated $5.7 million in structural damage. San Francisquito Creek Flooding Because storm flows far exceeded the capacity of San Francisquito Creek, the creek overtopped its banks in at least 15 locations, releasing water into Palo Alto, Menlo Park, and East Palo Alto (see attached map). Flooding occurred both upstream and downstream of the bridges at Middlefleld Road and Chaucer/Pope Streets. The creek began to overtop its banks a( around 1:30 a.m. at Seneca Street. The land bordering San Francisquito Creek naturally slopes away from the creek in a southeasterly direction. The floodwaters flowed through the Crescent Park and Green Gables neighborhoods, following ground contours until they reached the natural low area of the city. The water ended up in the vicinity of Oregon Expressway and Highway 101, where the ground elevation is more than 40 feet lower than at the point where San Francisquito Creek crosses Chaucer Street (see attached diagram). Since the land adjacent to San Francisquito Creek is relatively steep, the flows through Crescent Park were generally shallow (6-12" deep) and swiftly moving. The flows slowed and deepened as floodwaters headed southeast over flatter land. Eventually, the water from San Francisquito Creek ponded to a depth of three to four feet in the St. Francis Drive neighborhood near Oregon Expressway/Highway 101. Other low lying areas around DeSoto Drive and the Duveneck neighborhood were also seriously impacted by deep floodwaters. Once the floodwater stopped flowing, it was conveyed by the City’s storm drain system back into San Francisquito Creek and to the Matadero Pump Station to be pumped into Matadero Creek. The pumping process took several hours since the storm drains and pumps were working at capacity conveying both rain runoff and San Francisquito Creek overflow. Storm Drain Ponding The majority of flooding and property damage in Palo Alto was a result of floodwaters from San Francisquito Creek flowing across the city. In addition, some areas of the city were affected by localized ponding/flooding caused by storm drain back-ups in intersections, streets and gutters, and into some homes’ basements. The City’s storm drain system collects runoff from streets and properties and conveys it to San Francisquito, Matadero, Barton and CMR:232:98 . Page 3 of 17 Adobe Creeks. The system functioned properly throughout the course of the February 2-3 storm. However, the system is not designed as a regional flood control facility. Consequently, on the night of February 2, the heavy rainfall produced runoff that exceeded the capacity of the underground storm drain network, causing storm drains to back up. The situation was exacerbated by the high creek levels which slowed down the rate at which the creeks could receive water from the storm drains. Storm drain back-ups during the early part of the storm particularly affected neighborhoods in the eastern portion of the city and the College Terrace area. In addition, underpasses at Embarcadero Road/Alma Street, Oregon Expressway/Alma Street and El Camino Real/University Avenue were closed due to flooding when water pump stations at these locations were inundated with more storm runoff than they were designed to handle. DISCUSSION Early Storm Season Prevarations: Fall 1997/Winter 1998 The City of Palo Alto began preparing for the E1 Nino storm season in the fall of 1997. A cross-departmental committee was formed to identify needs and facilitate communication among Public Works, Utilities, Fire, Police and other departments. Trees were trimmed to prevent downed power lines, creeks were cleared, sandbag stations were stocked and emergency supplies were ordered. City staffparticipated in several regional workshops to stay abreast of the latest information regarding the storm season’s potential in light of E1 Nino and to hear advice on storm preparation techniques. The City sent fliers in Utility bills and issued a press release in early October to provide the public with tips and contacts to help them prepare for the storms. Throughout the winter months, City staff continued to monitor weather forecasts and restock the sandbag stations. Establishment of the Emergency Operations Center.(EOC): February_ 2. 1998 On Monday,. February 2, the forecast predicted heavy rain and high winds. Based on this forecast, two overtime fire personnel were called in at 8 a.m. to monitor creek levels and respond to storm-related emergencies, such as downed tree limbs, arcing power lines, etc. Overtime flrefighters were used in order to leave regular fire engine companies fully staffed and free to respond to other calls. The brunt of the storm on February 2 was predicted to hit Palo Alto in the early afternoon. By mid afternoon, it appeared that the storm was not going to be as severe as had been predicted. Consequently, at approximately 4:30 p.m., the overtime fire personnel were sent home. As evening approached, the rain and wind intensified. At approximately 6 p.m., Public Works crews began to receive and respond to reports of Storm drain back-ups and street flooding. At approximately 9:45 p.m., Fire units investigating a gas leak at Oregon Expressway observed significant storm drain back-up and street flooding. At this point, engine companies were instructed to monitor creek levels and report actual or potential flooding conditions to the battalion chief. At approximately 10 p.m., Fire units were sent to CMR:232:98 Page 4 of 17 a second gas leak investigation. It was determined that the gas leaks were being caused by water from storm drain back-ups reaching into basements and extinguishing water heater pilot lights. The fire chief contacted the battalion chief for a status report at approximately 10 p.m. At around 10:15 p.m., all Fire Department chief officers were directed to report to the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), and 10 firefighters were called back to duty to staff reserve fire engines and patrol units. In addition, personnel from the Police Department, Public Works, City Attorney and City Manager’s Office were called in to staff the EOC. By 10:45 p.m., Police, Fire and Public Works staff in the EOC had begun to develop a plan for surveying the extent and cause of flooding. It was not possible to predict whether, where and/or when flooding would occur. Storm drains had begun to back up in several parts of the city and the possibility existed that any of the city’s four creeks.might overflow. The Santa Clara Valley Water District informed City staff that it was concerned about the level of Barron Creek and was diverting water from Bah’on Creek to Matadero Creek. Flooding from the bay was also seen as a possibility. Consequently, City staffwere broadly dispersed. Police staff were assigned to survey City buildings, underpasses and intersections prone to flooding. Fire personnel were assigned to check residences and businesses in the areas believed to be at risk. Public Works staffwere monitoring creek levels, responding to storm drain back-up calls, resupplying sandbag stations and providing traffic control devices. At approximately 11:15 p.m. on February 2, the City Attorney, at the direction of the City Manager, drafted a declaration of a State of Emergency for the City of Palo Alto. (A Presidential Declaration of Emergency for Palo Alto and other cities in the Bay Area was issued on February 9.) The EOC, located in City Hall’s A level, was established officially as the City’s base for incident command and organizational operations in accordance with the statewide Standard Emergency Management System. Staffed 24 hours a day in the initial days of the storm, the EOC served as a central point of communication and coordination for all relevant City personnel. The EOC was not deactivated until February 15. The City Manager was designated as the Director of Emergency Services and the Fire Chief was designated as the EOC Chief. To determine how the City’s limited resources would be directed, a mission statement was established for the EOC. The primary mission was to ensure public safety and prevent the loss of life. The secondary mission, to take effect when emergency conditions subsided, was to provide residents with recovery assistance. Emergency Operations: February_ 2-3. 1998 On February 2-3, and throughout the subsequent week, the EOC was staffed 24 hours a day, requiting many staff to work shifts of 12 hours or longer. Police personnel were kept on duty as their shi~s ended and oncoming personnel were called in early. The Public Works Department staffed seven field crews and had four managers directing field operations. Additional fire fighters were called in to staff remaining reserve Fire vehicles. Every Fire CMR:232:98 Page 5 of 17 Department vehicle was eventually placed into service. Once the EOC was activated, City staff took several actions in pursuit of the primary public safety mission. These actions included: responding to emergency calls; patrolling neighborhoods and providing evacuation notification and assistance; establishing shelter; maintaining road safety; coordinating with other jurisdictions; and providing public information. Response to Emergency Calls During an average 24 hour period, the City receives 450 calls on its Communications Center lines. In the 27 hour period starting at 9 p.m. on February 2, the City received 3,231 calls on these lines. This call volume does not include calls placed directly to the EOC. While the majority of these 3,231 calls were flood-related, there were also several calls requesting more typical kinds of emergency information and assistance that required a response. Neighborhood Patrols, Notification and Evacuation Assistance Police and fire vehicles began patrolling neighborhoods at about 12:45 a.m. on February 3 to identify areas in need of evacuation and to begin the evacuation process. It became clear, however, that police cars could not clear the standing water in some areas. Five Police vehicles were disabled during the course of the evening. Police units assisted in notification and evacuation where possible, but focused mainly on security in the evacuated areas and traffic safety issues. This left the City’s higher Fire engines as the primary vehicles for entering flooded neighborhoods. When San Francisquito Creek overflowed, even Fire engines were prevented from accessing some areas. The City’s rescue boat was put into service to assist in the rescue of a motorist in the Oregon Expressway underpass and in home evacuations. In some instances, fire and police sirens and emergency vehicle public address systems were used to alert residents of the risk of flooding and to advise evacuation. Such notification took place in the Matadero Creek area around Louis Road, Van Auken Circle, and Amarillo Avenue. However, some fire engine sirens, which are located at bumper level, were rendered inoperable when they became submerged in floodwater from San Francisquito Creek. In some neighborhoods, firefighters went door-to-door to notify residents about the flood. Unfortunately, City staffwere not able to reach all impacted areas during the notification and evacuation process on February 2-3. This process was hampered due to limitations in the available notification technology, a lack of certainty regarding when and where flooding would occur, the inability of City vehicles to access flooded areas, and the limited number of staff resources available to disperse throughout the city to monitor creeks, assist in evacuations and rescues, and respond to other emergency calls. Evacuations were prompted either in response to 9-1-1 calls or field observations by City staff. The first evacuations took place at about 12:45 a.m., prior to the overflow of San CMR:232:98 Page 6 of 17 Francisquito Creek. Storm drain back-ups prompted evacuations of homes in the areas of Marshall Drive, Walter Hays Drive and Lambert Avenue. In addition, an extended rescue was conducted of a driver who was trapped when his vehicle was submerged and over-turned in the flooded Oregon Expressway underpass at Alma Street. It was during this rescue, at about 1:30 a.m., that the first reports were received regarding the overflow of San Francisquito Creek. At this point, Fire units were diverted to provide evacuation notification. in the areas of Seneca Street, Hale Street, Guinda Street, Palo Alto Avenue and University Avenue. Residents were advised to evacuate, but were not forced to do so. Given the inaccessibility and danger presented by flooded roadways, residents were given the option to remain in their homes, and seek "shelter in place." Many residents took this option and chose to stay at home. Those who chose to evacuate were taken by the Fire Department to a central location for transport to the City’s emergency shelter. The time required for each evacuation prevented staff from reaching all areas that might have required evacuation assistance. Evacuations continued throughout the early morning of February 3. Eventually, City staff helped evacuate approximately 100 individuals from their homes. Shelter Arrangements The City worked with the American Red Cross to set up an emergency shelter at the Cubbedey Community Center gymnasium. The City coordinated transportation to and from the shelter using school buses from the Palo Alto Unified School District. Ultimately, 200 residents were sheltered at Cubbedey. City Council members and staff visited the shelter nightly to check in with evacuees and provide them with information. The shelter was kept open until February 8. Residents still requiring shelter at that point were given hotel vouchers. Maintenance of Road Safety Police and Public Works staff worked throughout the storm to maintain the safety of the roads. Storm drains and pumps were checked to ensure that they were functioning properly. Barricades and signs were installed to divert traffic from inaccessible and unsafe areas. Several major roadways were closed, including the Highway 101 off ramps at University Avenue and Embarcadero Road, in addition to portions of Alma Street, University Avenue, Embarcadero Road, Oregon Expressway, East Bayshore Road, and West Bayshore Road. Safe routes into the City were identified and publicized. Coordination with Other Jurisdictions The City contacted the Palo Alto Unified School District to inform it of flood conditions and suggest that schools be closed on February 3. Palo Alto requested and received assistance from the City of Mountain View to respond to a fire call during Palo Alto’s peak call volume on February 2-3. The City of Palo Alto was not able to provide mutual aid to the other cities and jurisdictions that requested it because of the higher demand for service in Pal0 Alto. The City also maintained open lines of communication with the Santa Clara Valley Water CMR:232:98 Page 7 of 17 District and Santa Clara County Office of Emergency Services. Public Information Staff in the EOC maintained current updates of storm related information, including evacuated areas, road closures, creek levels, sandbag sites, and weather forecasts. This information was made available to public in a variety of ways, including: press releases to radio/television stations and newspapers; a continual scroll on cable channel 16; postings to the City’s website; and a 24 hour phone information line. Recovery_ Operations and Emergency Preparedness: Starting February. 4. 1998 When emergency conditions subsided on February 4, it was possible to dedicate City resources to the secondary mission of the EOC. City staff began recovery planning and providing non-emergency assistance to flooded households. In addition, the City developed plans for notification and emergency response in the event that continued rains brought about additional flooding. The EOC remained fully activated with a full.staff contingent, 24 hours a day, for a total of seven days. After this point, the EOC was staffed around the clock with two Fire personnel who were in place to monitor weather conditions and serve as the initial start-up staff should the EOC need to be fully activated again. The EOC was deactivated on February 15, once the threat of continued flooding had passed. Recovery Assistance In the days, weeks and months following the flood, the City provided a range of assistance to Palo Alto residents and the community-at-large. Public Works sent clean-up crews into neighborhoods to clear roadways and sidewalks and haul away mud and debris from flooded areas. To assist residents with their clean-up processes, the City provided free debris bins in four central locations. Later, the City instituted a program to reimburse residents who rented their own debris bins from the Palo Alto Sanitation Company (PASCO). In addition, disposal fees at the City landfill were temporarily suspended. The Fire Department worked around the clock to pump water fi:om the basements and crawl spaces of 203 homes. The Public Works Department assessed road conditions and identified areas needing emergency repairs. The City’s Building Inspection Division assessed homes for flood damage and simplified the building permit process. The City Council voted to temporarily suspend building permit fees for storm-related repairs, effective through September 2, 1998. The Council also approved a process for residents to receive a credit on their utility bill if they increased their use of electricity, gas and water due to flood-related clean-up and repair. The City Council met with Palo Alto’s Federal and State legislators and asked them to help Palo Alto residents in their dealings with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and other Federal and State disaster relief organizations. The City provided space for the Small Business Association (SBA) to meet with residents at Mitchell Park Community Center. In addition, the City hired consultants to help residents with the Federal CMR:232:98 Page 8 of 17 flood assistance application process. City staff coordinated and/or participated in a variety of meetings with the public to disseminate information and hear people’s comments and concerns about the flood. Forum topics included the National Flood Insurance Program, the FEMA disaster assistance process and public health issues. A 24 hour phone line was provided by the City Clerk’s Office so that residents could ask questions and request assistance or leave messages for response during business hours. Emergency Preparation After the February 2-3 flood, weather forecasts predicted that a series of storms would continue to bring heavy rainfall to the San Francisquito Creek watershed. Consequently, the City took numerous steps to prepare for the potential of another flood. The Public Works Department worked to continuously stock four sandbag stations, providing over 200,000 sandbagsand 2,200 tons of sand. Unfortunately, at times the demand for sandbags out-paced the ability of Public Works and contractor crews to bring in new supplies. During these times of peak demand, Police personnel were on hand to ensure an orderly process at the sandbag sites. The American Red Cross Shelter at Cubberley Center was kept open until February 8. Supplies were ordered and contingency plans were made with the Red Cross and the Palo Alto Unified School District to open a second shelter at a school site in the north part of Palo Alto in the event of additional flooding. The Public Works Department worked with the Santa Clara Valley Water District to survey the creeks and remove any obstructions that might contribute to future flooding. Immediately following the flood, a process was put in place to monitor creek and weather conditions. Various investments were made in the following months to improve this process. A new weather station was installed in Foothills Park and new stream gauges were installed in San Francisquito, Matadero and Adobe Creeks. As a result of this new equipment, information regarding rainfall and creek levels can now be relayed automatically to City departments and eventually to the EOC. A procedure for notifying residents of the threat of flooding was developed. This procedure specified that radio broadcasts and neighborhood patrols would be used to notify residents of creek levels and recommend evacuation at various trigger points of creek capacity. Battery-operated AM/FM radios were made available to anyone who requested one. In addition to this short-term procedure, research into alternative disaster notification systems was begun. To inform residents of the flood notification plan and provide a variety of other important preparedness tips, a flood information poster was developed. This poster was delivered door- to-door in the flood impacted areas and mailed to every residence in the city. In addition, press releases were sent to the newspapers regularly and posted to the City’s website. The City Manager gave regular flood reports at City Council meetings and took out a series of CMR:232:98 Page 9 of 17 public announcements in the Palo Alto Weekly. A plan for contingency call routing was developed to handle the potentially high volume of calls the City might receive in the event of further flooding. A bank of phones and computers was identified in the Police Department to which non-emergency calls would be transferred from 9-1-1 and CommuniCations Dispatch lines. This routing plan was designed to ensure prompt response to requests for information while not overburdening emergency lines needed for calls regarding life threatening situations. In addition to near-term emergency preparations, the City has also focused on efforts to develop long-term flood prevention solutions. The City joined with other jurisdictions to create the San Francisquito Creek Coordinating Committee in order to coordinate plans for regional management of the creek watershed. This committee is comprised of representatives of: the Cities of Menlo Park, Palo Alto, East Palo Alto, Portola Valley, and Woodside; the Santa Clara Valley Water District; the San Mateo County Flood Control Division; Stanford Management Company; and the San Francisquito Creek Coordinated Resources Management and Planning (CRMP) Process. Several of the jurisdictions represented on the San Francisquito Creek Coordinating Committee are currently contemplating the creation of a joint powers agreement that would have the authority and resources to manage the watershed. In other efforts to promote long-term flood control solutions, the City of Palo contributed $8,500 to CRMP to support the group’s ongoing outreach efforts and projects regarding San Francisquito Creek watershed management. In addition, as a member of the Northwest Flood Control Zone Advisory Committee, Mayor Rosenbaum was instrumental in the Zone Advisory Committee’s decision to recommend that the Santa Clara Valley Water District board of directors include $500,000 in the Northwest Flood Control Zone’s 1998-99 budget for preliminary studies of San Francisquito Creek flood and erosion control options. Opportunities for Irnprovement Despite its efforts to be prepared for the E1 Nino storm season, the City was caught off guard by the intensity and pace of the February 2-3 flood. Many of the City’s emergency command and response personnel, as well as many in the community, had never before experienced a flood of this magnitude. Under these circumstances, City staffperformed to the best of their ability and were successful in providing a range of critical services to the community during and after the emergency. However, there were several aspects of the City’s emergency response that were not as effective as they could have been. These aspects include: information systems; disaster notification; public education; internal training; equipment/supplies; information and referral; and volunteer coordination. As mentioned in other sections of this report, many of these opportunities for improvement are already being addressed. CMR:232:98 Page 10 of 17 Information Systems The City’s primary sources of information regarding weather conditions were local news reports and Internet satellite images. This information was regional in nature and did not provide a detailed picture of weather patterns and forecasts specific to Palo Alto. Therefore, it was difficult for City staff to gauge the severity and possible impacts of various rainstorms. To remedy this situation, the City has purchased and installed a weather station in Foothills Park to gather and transmit rainfall data to the EOC so that the runoff into San Francisquito Creek may be better anticipated. The new weather station will also provide valuable information during the wildland fire season, such as fuel moisture, ground saturation, temperature, humidity, and wind speed and direction. The City’s primary method for monitoring creek levels was to deploy City staff from various departments to make visual and manual assessments. This approach was labor intensive, taking scarce staff resources from other critical emergency response tasks. An automated system of creek monitoring would have provided accurate, ongoing information in a timely fashion that might have made it easier for the City to determine whether, when and where the creeks would overtop their banks. Consequently, creek monitoring equipment has been installed on San Francisquito, Adobe and Matadero Creeks. The need for additional locations will be identified and new gauges will be installed. In addition, Palo Alto staff have met with representatives from the Cities of Menlo Park and East Palo Alto to discuss the potential for future collaboration on expansion of the creek monitoring system. Such information regarding creek levels, in addition to a more detailed understanding of ground level elevations, might have helped EOC command staff predict the trajectory of flood waters and optimize the allocation of scarce staffing resources for notification and evacuation assistance. The FEMA flood zone maps available in the EOC did not include elevation detail. From now on, such maps will be provided to command staff in the EOC. The City will also make fuller use of its Geographic Information System (GIS) mapping capabilities to analyze and track flood depths, property damage and other relevant data. Additional plans for improving emergency information systems will be addressed in the implementation of the Emergency Management Plan. Notification As previously mentioned, the City does not have in place a comprehensive notification system to quickly and effectively alert large portions of the City to an impending disaster. The air raid sirens that were part of the Civil Defense System were abandoned many years ago by the County Office of Emergency Services and are no longer functional. The various notification methods used by City emergency response staff during the flood were not sufficient. The City began sending press releases to the media when San Francisquito Creek overtopped its banks. However, since this took place at 1:30 a.m., this information did not reach many people. The sirens and public address systems on police and fire vehicles were not used in all affected areas and, when used, achieved only limited success. Police and fire sirens may have been too commonplace for residents to recognize that they signaled a CMR:232:98 Page 11 of 17 disaster that required their attention. In addition, as previously noted, some fire engine sirens were disabled by floodwaters. When public address messages were broadcast in some neighborhoods, they did not generate significant response since it was unclear to several residents within earshot what the messages were trying to communicate. Many residents called the City’s Communications Center for additional information. The City recognizes that the lack of a comprehensive disaster notification system was a major shortcoming in its emergency response. Staff has researched various options for notification that would provide distinct information to residents in the event of an emergency. On May 16, 1998, staff convened a demonstration in which four vendors presented different notification systems to City staff and community members. Staff and community representatives determined that two types of systems, given their complementary strengths, should be implemented in Palo Alto. Both of these systems can be used to notify and communicate with residents, businesses, City officials and City emergency response staff during time of emergency.. Staff recommends that Council approve a Budget Amendment Ordinance in the amount of $172,000 to implement these two systems, which are described below. The first system is a telephone-based community alert system that will allow authorized City staff to record and send a specific message to targeted residents and businesses automatically over the phone. Those to be contacted can be targeted by tracing areas of a map on a computer which is linked to a database of residential and business phone numbers. A message will be left if the phone is answered by a voice mail system or answering machine; Calling capacities range from 120 to over 3,800 calls per hour, based on a 60 second message. The number of calls per hour is determined by the length of the message and how many phones in the system are dedicated to placing calls. Palo Alto will have 16 phone lines dedicated around the clock for its use. The City can increase the number of phones available, and hence the number of calls per hour, by entering into mutual aid agreements with other subscribers to the alerting system so that their phone lines will be available for use when Palo Alto is facing an emergency. There are many advantages to this type of system. It is nearly universal, enabling the City to reach every resident and business owner with a telephone, without requiring them to purchase or install any additional equipment. It is flexible .and easy to operate and can be used for other purposes, such as calling businesses to remind them of fire prevention equipment certification dates or calling seniors who are home-bound to check on their well- being. The disadvantages of this system are that it may not reach those who are hearing impaired and will not function if phone service is disconnected. Another issue to be addressed is gaining permission to call unlisted phone numbers during emergency alerts. If the alerting system is not granted access to the emergency 9r 1-1 data base, which includes unlisted numbers, residents will be asked to voluntarily include their unlisted phone numbers in the emergency notification system. CMR:232:98 Page 12 of 17 The equipment to meet these requirements is estimated to cost $57,100 for the City to purchase and install. Annual data base and phone line expenses for the City are estimated at $18,000. To augment the telephone-based alerting system, a second satellite-based system will be installed. Using this system, City officials can send a text message, similar to a page, to a targeted audience in as little as 18 seconds. The page can be received and read on a stationary unit located in individual homes or businesses. In addition, mobile, belt units are available to reach people who are away from the home or office. A significant advantage to this type of satellite-based system is that it can cover an area as small as a city block or as large as the entire state at the same time and nearly instantaneously. It can also be used to reach the hearing impaired. The main disadvantage of the system is that it requires the purchase and installation of pager units for each household and business that is to receive the page. The stationary pager units cost $100 a piece. At a total cost of nearly $2.5 million, it would be prohibitively expensive for the City to equip each of Palo Alto’s estimated 24,620 households with pager units. Staff recommends that the City purchase the system and 200 pager units. These units could be used to equip community block captains who are trained as part of an emergency response public education campaign and willing to take responsibility for notifying and working with their neighbors. The pager units could also be installed in the homes of the disabled and hearing impaired, as well as City officials and key emergency response personnel. Above and beyond this, residents and business owners who wish to be part of the system will be ¯ given the option to purchase a pager. The cost to the City for purchasing the system will be $32,500. The City’s cost for buying 200 pager units will be $55,000. (At $250 a piece plus tax and shipping, these pager units cost more than the basic home model since they have a printer hookup and other special features.) The project will also include a contingency of $9,400. Public education Public education is a central and widely recognized component of disaster management. A primary goal of public education programs is to train residents to help themselves and their neighbors during the first 72 hours following a disaster. These programs help residents understand how to prepare for a disaster and what to do when one strikes. Ttie City’s disaster public education program was eliminated due to necessary budget reductions in 1988. Staff proposes that a comprehensive public awareness and education program be re-established as part of the implementation of the City’s Emergency Management Plan. lnternal training A number of emergency response staff were new to their positions and had not yet operated within the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS). Used throughout the state, SEMS provides a common organizational structure and set of terminology that facilitates communication and coordination both within and between organizations. CMR:232:98 Page 13 of 17 Additional training opportunities might have maximized the effectiveness of emergency response personnel. SEMS training exercises, as well as orientations regarding citywide and departmental emergency response roles and procedures, should be provided to staff in all departments at all levels on an ongoing basis. Initiatives to this effect will be included in the implementation of the City’s revised Emergency Management Plan. Emergency Response Equipment/Supplies EOC staff and field crews would have benefitted in their work from additional equipment and supplies. The phone and computer systems in the EOC are outdated. Computer terminals, hooked up to the City’s network, and phones with multiple lines are needed at each EOC station. Staff in the EOC also recognized that a dedicated fax line and terminals with Intemet and GIS capabilities were needed. Consequently, additional lines and equipment were installed in the days immediately following the flood. In addition, a more modem radio communication system is required to minimize disruption across workstations. The acquisition of a new Computer Assisted Dispatch system, recently approved by Council, will improve communication between the EOC and the City’s Emergency Dispatch Center to facilitate priority setting, resource allocation, and deployment of personnel. Despite the City’s efforts early in the storm season to stock up on supplies, certain items necessary in flooding of the magnitude experienced on February 2-3 were not readily available. Emergency response personnel were not equipped with sufficient foul weather clothing, flotation devices, submersible flashlights, etc. Firefighters performing evacuations were slowed down when their safety clothing became saturated and heavy. Caches of such emergency supplies should be distributed throughout the City for use by emergency responders and the impacted community.. Staff recommends that Council direct staffto include $228,000 in the 1998-99 budget to upgrade the Emergency Operation Center (EOC). This upgrade would include the purchase of phones, computer equipment, radio systems and equipment as outlined below. Telecommunications Equipment (including 11 phones, phone lines and modems, five circuit cards, one fax machine, 11 cellular phones, and other materials and labor) Computer Equipment (including seven computer workstations, two computer assisted dispatching workstations, two GIS workstations, one print/file server, one printer, and network installation) Radio System (including 16 radio remotes and headsets and, two portable radio chargers) Other expenses (including GIS modifications, one computer-based audio/visual projector, one large screen video monitor, and 10 ergonometric chairs) t Contingency (estimated at 10%) [Total $32,300 $84,700 $18,000 $59,000 $228,000 CMR:232:98 Page 14 of 17 Information and Referral The City provided general information to the public at-large through a variety of channels that are described elsewhere in this report. In addition, City staff received a great number of calls from individual residents requesting specific information and assistance. In some instances, these queries from residents were on topics outside of the City’s jurisdiction and expertise. Therefore, it was necessary to identify the appropriate contact and refer residents accordingly. This referral process was not always trouble-free since not every City staff member who received resident calls had access to current information and referral directories. Even when referrals were made to the right organizations, the City had no way to guarantee that the resident would receive the information or assistance they were looking for. This was frustrating to both the community and City staff. A similar situation took place to some extent when residents called for information and help that was within the City’s jurisdiction to provide. The City of Palo Alto is a large organization with more than 1,000 employees and many departments and programs located in several different geographical locations. There is no single point of contact or central switchboard to receive and route calls from the public. In the period following the flood, it was not uncommon for City staff members to be asked questions for which they did not readily have an answer. This fact, combined with the intense storm-related workloads faced by many City staff, made it difficult at times to respond quickly to resident concerns. Consequently, many residents expressed dissatisfaction with the City’s responsiveness. Through the implementation of the Emergency Management Plan, it will be necessary to address stafftraining in information and referral and the possible establishment of designated liaisons to help residents navigate various City programs and processes during times of emergency. Volunteer Coordination There were many requests for service, like clearing debris from flooded homes, to which the City was unable to respond given limited staffresources. In some instances, volunteers were available to provide such assistance. Unfortunately, there was no well-established process in place to recruit volunteers and match them with appropriate projects. Plans for volunteer coordination will be included in the implementation of the City’s revised Emergency Management Plan. Stren_mhs A primary purpose of this post-incident critique is to review the City’s policies and activities during the flood to identify opportunities for improvement. However, in order to present a balanced picture of the event, there are many positive outcomes and accomplishments that should-be noted. No fatalities or significant injuries resulted from the flood. No homes were so severely damaged that they had to be red-tagged by the City as structurally unsafe. CMR:232:98 Page 15 of 17 Approximately 100 people were safely evacuated by City emergency personnel and about 200 were provided with shelter. Utility services were maintained and no major power outages occurred during the course of the storm. The EOC was promptly established and a clear mission statement was developed early in its operation. A significant number of dedicated City emplo3~ees worked long hours in hazardous conditions without major injuries. A range of assistance was provided to residents, including basement pumping, free debris bins, landfill and building permit fee waivers, utility rate credits, and help-desk support with the Federal flood assistance application process. Effective internal communication was established through twice daily cross departmental briefing sessions, calls and faxes to City Council Members, and e-mails to all City staff. Information was provided to the public through a variety of channels including: press releases, community meetings, the City’s website, the Channel 16 scroll, a 24 hour phone line, public announcements in the Palo Alto Weekly, reports to the City Council, and a flood information poster delivered to every residence in the city. A 24 hour purchasing and requisition system was established to promptly secure needed emergency supplies and materials. Coordination with the Palo Alto Unified School District, American Red Cross, Santa Clara Valley Water District and Santa Clara County Office of Emergency Services occurred early in the emergency response process. RESOURCE IMPACT The City estimates it will incur more than $2 million in expenses Stemming directly from the February 2-3 flood, including emergency response, repair of damaged public property and recovery assistance to residents. The City is seeking reimbursement for these expenses from the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The impact on the City’s General Fund will depend on FEMA’s response to the City’s request for reimbursement. To date, $1.3 million has been moved from the Reserve for Emergencies to cover these expenses. It is anticipated that the Reserve for Emergencies will be replenished with year-end budget savings. To prepare for future disasters, the City has spent an additional $13,000 to purchase a weather station in Foothills Park. In addition, the Storm Drainage Fund has spent $15,718 to install a creek detection system on San Francisquito, Adobe and Matadero Creeks. The Reserve for Emergencies will also be used to cover these expenditures. Through this report, staff requests approval of a Budget Amendment Ordinance in the amount of $172,000 to create a new CIP for an Emergency Notification System and $228,000 in the 1998-99 budget to upgrade the EOC. These items will be funded by the Reserve for Emergencies. Additional resource requests will be made in the context of the adoption of the proposed Emergency Management Plan and its addendum which will address CMR:232:98 Page 16 of 17 the areas for improvement identified in this report, including information systems; public education; internal training; equipment/supplies; information and referral; and volunteer coordination. POLICY IMPLICATIONS No policy changes are being recommended at this time. However, subsequent reports to Council addressing items contained in this report may recommend changes in policy. TIMELINE Many of the opportunities for improvement identified in this report are in the process of being addressed. Several will require further community input, staff analysis, and Council direction. In six to nine months, staff will return to Council with an addendum to the Emergency Management Plan that describes the resources and programs that will be put in place to address the areas for improvement identified herein. ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW This project is exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) pursuant to Section 15301 (minor change to existing facilities) of the CEQA guidelines. ATTACHMENTS Budget Amendment Ordinance Exhibit A A B C D Emergency Notification System CIP Project Description Map of San Francisquito Creek Watershed Graph of San Francisquito Creek Water Flows Map of Flooding from San Francisquito Creek Ground Elevation Diagram PREPARED BY:Ruben Grijalva, Fire Chief Lynne Johnson, Assistant Police Chief Joe Teresi, Senior Engineer Audrey ~ Senior ~Seymour,e Assistant CITY MANAGER APPROV~~~ . cc:Palo Alto Neighborhood Associations Palo Alto Chamber of Commerce CMR:232:98 Page 17 of 17 ORDINANCE NO. ORDINANCE OF THE ~COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF PALO ALTO AMENDING THE BUDGET FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1997-98 TO PROVIDE AN ADDITIONAL APPROPRIATION IN THE AMOUNT OF $172,000 TO CREATE A NEW CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT PROJECT, NUMBER 19821, EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTEM WHEREAS, pursuant to the provisions of Section 12 of Article III of the Charter of the City of Palo Alto, the Council on June 23, 1997 did adopt a budget for fiscal year 1997-98; and WHEREAS, the City does not.have in place a comprehensive notification system to quickly and effectively alert large portions of the City to an impending disaster; and WHEREAS, during the recent flood, City staff were not able to reach all impacted areas during the notification and evacuation process; and WHEREAS, research into alternative disaster notification +systems was begun; and WHEREAS, it seems prudent to purchase a new emergency notification system that would provide distinct and meaningful information to residents in the event of an emergency; and WHEREAS, the budget needs to be amended to create and fund a capital improvement project number 19821, Emergency Notification System; and WHEREAS, City Council au6horization is needed to .amend the 1997-98 budget as hereinafter set forth. NOW, THEREFORE, the Council of the City of Palo Alto does ORDAIN as follows: SECTION i. Capital Improvement Project (CIP) Number 19821, Emergency Notification System, is hereby created. A description of the CIP is shown on Exhibit ~A" attached hereto and made a part of this ordinance. SECTION 2. The sum of One Hundred Seventy Two Thousand Dollars ($172,000) is hereby appropriated to Capital Improvement Project No. 19821, Emergency Notification System, and the Budget ’Stabilization Reserve is correspondingly reduced. SECTION 3. This transaction will reduce the Reserve for Emergencies in the General Fund from $4,300,000 to $4,128,000. SECTION 4. As specified in Section 2.28.080(a) of the Palo Alto Municipal Code, a two-thirds vote of the City Council is required to adopt this ordinance. SECTION 5. This project is exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) pursuant to Section 15301 (Minor Change to Existing Facilities) of the CEQA Guidelines. SECTION 6. As provided in Section 2.04.350 of the Palo Alto Municipal Code, this ordinance shall become effective upon adoption. INTRODUCED AND PASSED: AYES: NOES: ABSTENTIONS: ABSENT: ATTEST:APPROVED: City Clerk Mayor APPROVED AS TO FORM:Assistant City Manager Senior Asst. City Attorney Director, Administrative Services Department Fire Chief PROJECT DESCRIPTION This project will fund the acquisition of a computer-based community alerting/notification system to provide the City with the ability to notify and evacuate the community in the event of a disaster, such as a wildland fire, hazardous materials incident, or police emergency. The alerting/notification system is actually two separate systems. The first is a telephone-based community alert system which will allow authorized City staff to record and automatically phone a specific message to targeted residents and businesses. The second is a satellite-based system which uses pagers to send a text message to residents and businesses who own such pagers. This second system is especially helpful for residents who are disabled or hearing impaired. PROJECT JUSTIFICATION The City currently lacks a comprehensive notification system which can quickly and effectively notify large portions of the City as to an imminent disaster. These two systems, working together, will provide emergency notification capability for large portions of the community in a short period of time in the event of a disaster; provide automated callback capability for City personnel; notify selected areas of the community of power outages or similar events to minimize the use of emergency 9-t-1 telephone lines; and maintain detailed management records of all calls made, completed, and not completed. FUTURE FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS FISCAL YEAR PY Budget 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 AMOUNT $172,000 COMPONENTS Acquisition and installation of emergency notification system. Includes $18,000 for maintenance in the first year which will be part of the oper- ating budget in future years. Sources of Funding: Reserve for.Emergencies IMPACT AND SUPPORT ANALYSIS Environmental: Design Elements: Operating: Telecommunications: Categorically exempt under Section 15301 of CEQA, minor change to an existing facility. None. Ongoing maintenance. Cost of phone line in future years. COMPREHENSIVE PLAN~ This project furthers Program 48 of the Environmental Resources element of the Comprehensive Plan related to disaster preparedness. ATTACHME Watershed Map Source: San Francisquito Creek CRMP 0 0 spuesnoq.L ($30) puooes / oOW ~ o!qno ATTACHMENT C Source and Extent of San Francisquito Creek Flooding Associated With "1998 Winter Storms" N ~gt’d :433~I0 iunoo ~i~1315 69/3N 3rlN3AV NO03~IO 3nN3AV NI16~M 3nN3AV NVINIId 1V 3f3N3AV N"IOONI7 .1.33~J1S VO3N3S 8V"JN 3nN3AV ),..LIS83AINrl "IS VO3N3S tV "3^V NO1.bL7 ATTACHMENT D