HomeMy WebLinkAbout2021-11-03 Utilities Advisory Commission Agenda PacketMATERIALS RELATED TO AN ITEM ON THIS AGENDA SUBMITTED TO THE COMMISSION AFTER DISTRIBUTION OF THE AGENDA PACKET ARE
AVAILABLE FOR PUBLIC INSPECTION IN THE UTILITIES DEPARTMENT AT PALO ALTO CITY HALL, 250 HAMILTON AVE. DURING NORMAL BUSINESS
HOURS.
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITY ACT (ADA)
Persons with disabilities who require auxiliary aids or services in using City facilities, services or programs or who would like information on the City’s
compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, may contact (650) 329-2550 (Voice) 24 hours in advance.
NOTICE IS POSTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION 54954.2(a) OR 54956
Supporting materials are available online at https://www.cityofpaloalto.org/gov/boards/uac/default.asp on Thursday, 5 days preceding the
meeting.
****BY VIRTUAL TELECONFERENCE ONLY****
Join Zoom Webinar Here Meeting ID: 966 9129 7246 Phone: 1 (669) 900-6833
Pursuant to the provisions of California Governor’s Executive Order N-29-20, issued on March 17, 2020, to prevent
the spread of COVID-19, this meeting will be held by virtual teleconference only, with no physical location. The
meeting will be broadcast on Cable TV Channel 26, live on Midpen Media Center at https://midpenmedia.org.
Members of the public who wish to participate by computer or phone can find the instructions at the end of this
agenda.
I. ROLL CALL
II. AGENDA REVIEW AND REVISIONS
III. ORAL COMMUNICATIONS
Members of the public are invited to address the Commission on any subject not on the agenda. A reasonable time restriction may
be imposed at the discretion of the Chair. State law generally precludes the UAC from discussing or acting upon any topic initially
presented during oral communication.
IV. APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES
Approval of the Minutes of the Utilities Advisory Commission Meeting held on October 6, 2021
V. UNFINISHED BUSINESS - None
VI. UTILITIES DIRECTOR REPORT
VII. NEW BUSINESS
1. Adoption of a Resolution Authorizing Use of Teleconferencing for Utilities Advisory Action
Commission Meetings During Covid-19 State of Emergency
2. Staff Recommends the UAC Recommend the City Council Accept a Presentation on Action
Current and Pending State Legislation and Approve the Continued use of the 2021
Legislative Guidelines Through 2022
3. Discussion and Presentation on the Impact of Decarbonization on the Resiliency Discussion
of Single Family Homes in Palo Alto
UTILITIES ADVISORY COMMISSION – SPECIAL MEETING
WEDNESDAY, November 3, 2021 – 5:00 P.M.
ZOOM Webinar
REVISED
Chairman: Lisa Forssell Vice Chair: Lauren Segal Commissioners: John Bowie, A.C. Johnston, Phil Metz, Greg Scharff, and Loren Smith Council Liaison: Eric Filseth
MATERIALS RELATED TO AN ITEM ON THIS AGENDA SUBMITTED TO THE COMMISSION AFTER DISTRIBUTION OF THE AGENDA PACKET ARE
AVAILABLE FOR PUBLIC INSPECTION IN THE UTILITIES DEPARTMENT AT PALO ALTO CITY HALL, 250 HAMILTON AVE. DURING NORMAL BUSINESS
HOURS.
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITY ACT (ADA)
Persons with disabilities who require auxiliary aids or services in using City facilities, services or programs or who would like information on the City’s
compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, may contact (650) 329-2550 (Voice) 24 hours in advance.
VIII. COMMISSIONER COMMENTS and REPORTS from MEETINGS/EVENTS
IX. FUTURE TOPICS FOR UPCOMING MEETINGS: December 01, 2021
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION - The materials below are provided for informational purposes, not for action or
discussion during UAC Meetings (Govt. Code Section 54954.2(a)(3)).
Informational Reports 12-Month Rolling Calendar Public Letter(s) to the UAC
MATERIALS RELATED TO AN ITEM ON THIS AGENDA SUBMITTED TO THE COMMISSION AFTER DISTRIBUTION OF THE AGENDA PACKET ARE
AVAILABLE FOR PUBLIC INSPECTION IN THE UTILITIES DEPARTMENT AT PALO ALTO CITY HALL, 250 HAMILTON AVE. DURING NORMAL BUSINESS
HOURS.
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITY ACT (ADA)
Persons with disabilities who require auxiliary aids or services in using City facilities, services or programs or who would like information on the City’s
compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, may contact (650) 329-2550 (Voice) 24 hours in advance.
PUBLIC COMMENT INSTRUCTIONS
Members of the Public may provide public comments to teleconference meetings via email,
teleconference, or by phone.
1. Written public comments may be submitted by email to UACPublicMeetings@CityofPaloAlto.org.
2. Spoken public comments using a computer will be accepted through the teleconference meeting.
To address the Commission, click on the link below for the appropriate meeting to access a Zoom-
based meeting. Please read the following instructions carefully.
A. You may download the Zoom client or connect to the meeting in-browser. If using your
browser, make sure you are using a current, up-to-date browser: Chrome 30+, Firefox 27+,
Microsoft Edge 12+, Safari 7+. Certain functionality may be disabled in older browsers
including Internet Explorer.
B. You will be asked to enter an email address and name. We request that you identify
yourself by name as this will be visible online and will be used to notify you that it is your
turn to speak.
C. When you wish to speak on an agenda item, click on “raise hand.” The Attendant will
activate and unmute speakers in turn. Speakers will be notified shortly before they are
called to speak.
D. When called, please limit your remarks to the time limit allotted.
E. A timer will be shown on the computer to help keep track of your comments.
3. Spoken public comments using a smart phone use the telephone number listed below. When you
wish to speak on an agenda item hit *9 on your phone so we know that you wish to speak. You will
be asked to provide your first and last name before addressing the Council. You will be advised how
long you have to speak. When called please limit your remarks to the agenda item and time limit
allotted.
Join Zoom Webinar Here
Meeting ID: 966-9129-7246
City of Palo Alto (ID # 13734)
Utilities Advisory Commission Staff Report
Report Type: New Business Meeting Date: 11/3/2021
City of Palo Alto Page 1
Title: Adoption of a Resolution Authorizing Use of Teleconferencing for
Utilities Advisory Commission Meetings During Covid-19 State of Emergency
From: Director of Utilities
Lead Department: Utilities
Recommendation
Adopt a Resolution (Attachment A) authorizing the use of teleconferencing under Government
Code Section 54953(e) for meetings of the Utilities Advisory Commission (UAC) and its
committees due to the Covid-19 declared state of emergency.
Background
In February and March 2020, the state and the County declared a state of emergency due to
the Covid-19 pandemic. Both emergency declarations remain in effect.
On September 16, 2021, the Governor signed AB 361, a bill that amends the Brown Act,
effective October 1, 2021, to allow local policy bodies to continue to meet by
teleconferencing during a state of emergency without complying with restrictions in State
law that would otherwise apply, provided that the policy bodies make certain findings at
least once every 30 days.
AB 361, codified at California Government Code Section 54953(e), empowers local policy bodies
to convene by teleconferencing technology during a proclaimed state of emergency under the
State Emergency Services Act in any of the following circumstances:
(A)The legislative body holds a meeting during a proclaimed state of emergency, and
state or local officials have imposed or recommended measures to promote social
distancing.
(B)The legislative body holds a meeting during a proclaimed state of emergency for the
purpose of determining, by majority vote, whether as a result of the emergency,
meeting in person would present immin ent risks to the health or safety of
attendees.
Staff: Dean Batchelor
City of Palo Alto Page 2
(C) The legislative body holds a meeting during a proclaimed state of emergency and has
determined, by majority vote, pursuant to subparagraph (B) (B), that, as a result of
the emergency, meeting in person would present imminent risks to the health or
safety of attendees. (Gov. Code § 54953(e)(1).)
In addition, Section 54953(e)(3) requires that policy bodies using teleconferencing reconsider
the state of emergency within 30 days of the first teleconferenced meeting after October 1,
2021, and at least every 30 days thereafter, and find that one of the following circumstances
exists:
1. The state of emergency continues to directly impact the ability of the
members to meet safely in person.
2. State or local officials continue to impose or recommend measures to
promote social distancing.
City of Palo Alto Page 3
Discussion
At this time, the circumstances in Section 54953(e)( 1)(A) exist. The Santa Clara County Health
Officer continues to recommend measures to promote outdoor activity, physical distancing and
other social distancing measures, such as masking, in certain contexts. (See August 2, 2021
Order.) In addition, the California Department of Industrial Relations Division of Occupational
Safety and Health (Cal/OSHA) has promulgated Section 3205 of Title 8 of the California Code of
Regulations, which requires most employers in California, including in the City, to train a nd
instruct employees about measures that can decrease the spread of COVID -19, including
physical distancing and other social distancing measures.
Accordingly, Section 54953(e)(1)(A) authorizes the City to continue using teleconferencing for
public meetings of its policy bodies, provided that any and all members of the public who wish
to address the body or its committees have an opportunity to do so, and that the statutory and
constitutional rights of parties and the members of the public attending the m eeting via
teleconferencing are protected.
To comply with public health directives and promote public safety, Palo Alto policy bodies
have been meeting via teleconference since March 2020. On September 27, 2021, the City
Council considered the format for future Council, committee, and Board and Commission
meetings. Council determined that beginning November 1, 2021, Council meetings would be
conducted using a hybrid format that allows Council Members and the public to decide
whether to attend in person, following masking and distancing protocols, or participate via
teleconference. Council directed that Council standing and ad-hoc committees and Boards
and Commissions would continue meeting via teleconference through January 2022.
Adoption of the Resolution at Attachment A will make the findings required by Section
54953(e)(3) to allow the continued use of teleconferencing for meetings of the Utilities
Advisory Commission (UAC) and its committees.
Attachments:
• Attachment A: Resolution
NOT YET APPROVED
Resolution No. ____
Resolution Making Findings to Allow Teleconferenced Meetings Under California Government
Code Section 54953(e)
R E C I T A L S
A. California Government Code Section 54953(e) empowers local policy bodies to convene by
teleconferencing technology during a proclaimed state of emergency under the State Emergency
Services Act so long as certain conditions are met; and
B. In March 2020, the Governor of the State of California proclaimed a state of emergency
in California in connection with the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (“COVID-19”) pandemic, and that state
of emergency remains in effect; and
C. In February 2020, the Santa Clara County Director of Emergency Services and the
Santa Clara County Health Officer declared a local emergency, which declarations were
subsequently ratified and extended by the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors, and those
declarations also remain in effect; and
D. On September 16, 2021, the Governor signed AB 361, a bill that amends the Brown Act
to allow local policy bodies to continue to meet by teleconferencing during a state of emergency
without complying with restrictions in State law that would otherwise apply, provided that the
policy bodies make certain findings at least once every 30 days; and
E. While federal, State, and local health officials emphasize the critical importance of
vaccination and consistent mask-wearing to prevent the spread of COVID-19, the Santa Clara County
Health Officer has issued at least one order, on August 2, 2021 (available online at here), that continues
to recommend measures to promote outdoor activity, physical distancing and other social distancing
measures, such as masking, in certain contexts; and
F. The California Department of Industrial Relations Division of Occupational Safety and
Health (“Cal/OSHA”) has promulgated Section 3205 of Title 8 of the California Code of Regulations,
which requires most employers in California, including in the City, to train and instruct employees
about measures that can decrease the spread of COVID-19, including physical distancing and other
social distancing measures; and
G. The Utilities Advisory Commission has met remotely during the COVID-19 pandemic and
can continue to do so in a manner that allows public participation and transparency while minimizing
health risks to members, staff, and the public that would be present with in-person meetings while
this emergency continues; now, therefore,
NOT YET APPROVED
The Utilities Advisory Commission RESOLVES as follows:
1. As described above, the State of California remains in a state of emergency due to the
COVID-19 pandemic. At this meeting, the Utilities Advisory Commission has considered the
circumstances of the state of emergency.
2. As described above, State and County officials continue to recommend measures
to promote physical distancing and other social distancing measures, in some
settings.
AND BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That for at least the next 30 days, meetings of the Utilities Advisory
Commission and its committees will occur using teleconferencing technology. Such meetings of the
Utilities Advisory Commission and its committees that occur using teleconferencing technology will
provide an opportunity for any and all members of the public who wish to address the body and its
committees and will otherwise occur in a manner that protects the statutory and constitutional rights
of parties and the members of the public attending the meeting via teleconferencing; and, be it
FURTHER RESOLVED, That the Utilities Advisory Commission staff liaison is directed to place a resolution
substantially similar to this resolution on the agenda of a future meeting of the Utilities Advisory
Commission within the next 30 days. If the Utilities Advisory Commission does not meet within the next
30 days, the staff liaison is directed to place a such resolution on the agenda of the immediately following
meeting of the Utilities Advisory Commission.
INTRODUCED AND PASSED:
AYES:
NOES:
ABSENT:
ABSTENTIONS:
ATTEST:
Staff Liaison Chair of Utilities Advisory Commission
APPROVED AS TO FORM: APPROVED:
City Attorney Department Head
City of Palo Alto (ID # 13608)
Utilities Advisory Commission Staff Report
Report Type: New Business Meeting Date: 11/3/2021
City of Palo Alto Page 1
Title: Discussion and Presentation on the Impact of Decarbonization on the
Resiliency of Single Family Homes in Palo Alto
From: Director of Utilities
Lead Department: Utilities
Recommendation
This is a report for the Utilities Advisory Commission’s review and discussion. No action is
required.
Executive Summary
The City of Palo Alto Utilities (CPAU) continually strives to maintain and enhance the Palo Alto
community’s electricity and natural gas supply reliability and resiliency. As the community
progresses on decarbonizing buildings and transportation through electrification, there has
been an increase interest to learn about the impact of decarbonization on the resiliency of the
community.
This summer, the Shultz Fellowship at Stanford University sponsored a summer fellowship at
CPAU to explore the resiliency impacts of electrifying natural gas appliances and gasoline
vehicles in single family residences (SFRs) in Palo Alto. The attached report (Attachment A)
provides the study results.
The study suggests that some homes with multiple fuel sources such as electricity, natural gas
and gasoline can have resiliency advantages in some major disruptions; however, these
resiliency advantages appear to be more limited than one might think. For example, most
natural gas furnaces will not function in the event of an electric outage and vehicles will have
limited range, since most gasoline stations will not be able to dispense gasoline after a power
outage as they do not have back-up power. Therefore, a fully electrified home with back-up
power may be more resilient than a mixed-fuel home without backup power across a wide
array of natural disasters or service disruptions, because all of the energy needs can be served if
the building has sufficient onsite generation, though the additional resiliency comes with an
additional expense. On the other hand, in a localized electric-only outage, providing backup
power to a mixed-fuel home requires less onsite electricity generation than providing backup
power to an all-electric home due to the larger electric load in an all-electric home.
Staff: Shiva Swaminathan
City of Palo Alto Page 2
The analysis explored the relative resiliency of electricity versus natural distribution systems in
the event of natural disasters but was not able draw any definitive conclusions. For example,
natural gas systems are more reliable during typical annual weather events, which often cause
short, local electricity outages each year. Using data from the past five years, customers in Palo
Alto on average experienced 500 electrical interruptions compared to seven gas service
interruption per year per 1000 customers. However, research suggests that in the event of
major outage scenarios such as earthquakes the restoration times for natural gas service tend
to be much longer than those for the electrical services, though typically affecting fewer people
than electric service outages.
The study also found an array of energy supply products that homeowners could purchase and
install to make their homes more resilient to withstand natural disasters and service
disruptions. These include simple and low-cost products such as small battery packs to
propane/gasoline electric generators to outdoor propane barbeques. Higher cost solutions
include large solar + storage systems or large 20 kW natural gas-powered stationary generators.
In summary, the Stanford Fellow and staff hope this study will provide useful context as the
community seeks to electrify and decarbonize homes while enhancing community resiliency.
There are trade-offs in both mixed-fuel and all-electric homes depending on the situation.
Resource Impact
The study was sposored by the Shultz Fellowship at Stanford University, hence no monetary
expenditure were incurred to undertake this study. The report does not have any
recommendation that would required additional work or resources at this time.
Policy Implications
Part of CPAU’s mission is to provide safe and reliable utlity services and this study enhances the
community’s understanding of the resilinecy impacts of decarbonizing Single Family Homes in
Palo Alto.
Stakeholder Engagement
Sharing the study result with the Commission for discussion and input is part of staff’s effort to
engage the community on the topic of utility service resiliency and is a follow -up to the series of
community meetings on this topic over the past few years.
Environmental Review
The UAC’s review of this report is not a project requiring environmental review for the purpose
of the California Environmental Quality Act, as an administrative activity of government that
will not result in direct or indirect physical changes in the environment (Cal. Co de Regs. Tit. 14
Sec. 15378(b)(5).
Attachments:
• Attachment A: Report on Single Family Resiliency All-Electric
• Attachment B: Presentation
Impact of Decarbonization on the Resiliency
of Single-Family Homes in Palo Alto
Shoja Jahangard
Stanford University Shultz Fellow
September 30, 2021
Staff: Shiva Swaminathan
CITY OF
PALO
ALTO
2
Table of Contents
Executive Summary ............................................................................................................... 3
Background ........................................................................................................................... 3
Discussion ............................................................................................................................. 4
A. Home Appliance Survey and Appliance Ability to Operate During Service Disruptions ........ 5
B. Electric Vehicles (EV’s) vs Internal Combustion Engine Vehicles (ICE vehicles) ..................... 5
C. Electricity Use of Mixed Fuel Homes Versus All Electric Homes ............................................. 6
D. Methods to Enhance the Energy Resiliency of Single-Family Homes in Palo Alto ................. 7
E. Reliability Comparison of Palo Alto’s Electricity and Natural Gas Systems ............................ 9
F. Resiliency Comparison of Palo Alto’s Electricity and Natural Gas Systems .......................... 10
G. CPAU Initiatives to Enhance Energy Reliability and Resiliency ............................................. 12
Summary of Findings ........................................................................................................... 12
Areas for Further Research .................................................................................................. 13
Appendices ......................................................................................................................... 15
Appendix A: Appliance Characterization ................................................................................... 15
Appendix B: RASS Energy Use Data ........................................................................................... 27
Appendix C: Palo Alto Energy Use Data .................................................................................... 30
Appendix D: Home Energy Resiliency Measure ........................................................................ 32
Appendix E: Reliability Comparison Between Natural Gas and Electricity Service ................... 40
Appendix F: Resiliency Comparison for Various Outage Scenarios .......................................... 42
References .......................................................................................................................... 54
3
Impact of Decarbonization on the Resiliency of Single-Family Homes in Palo Alto
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The 2021 Shultz Fellowship at Stanford University sponsored a summer fellowship at City of Palo
Alto Utilities (CPAU) to explore the resiliency impacts of electrifying natural gas appliances and
gasoline vehicles in single-family residences (SFRs) in Palo Alto.
This study suggests that some homes with multiple fuel sources such as electricity, natural gas
and gasoline can have resiliency advantages in some major disruptions; however, these resiliency
advantages appear to be more limited than one might think. For example, most natural gas
furnaces will not function in the event of an electric outage and most gasoline stations will not
be able to dispense gasoline after a power outage as they do not have back-up power. Therefore,
a fully electrified home with backup power may be more resilient than a mixed-fuel home
without backup power across a wide array of natural disasters or service disruptions, because all
of the energy needs can be served if they have sufficient onsite generation. But providing backup
power to a mixed-fuel home requires less onsite electricity generation (with storage) than
providing backup power to an all-electric home due to the larger electric load in an all-electric
home.
The analysis explored the relative resiliency of electricity versus natural distribution systems in
the event of natural disasters but was not able draw any definitive conclusions. For example,
natural gas systems are more reliable during normal weather events, while electrical systems
experience more regular outages annually. Using data from the past five years, customers in Palo
Alto on average experienced 500 electrical outages compared to seven gas service interruptions
per year per 1000 customers. However, research suggest that in the event of major outage
scenarios such as earthquakes the restoration times for natural gas service tend to be longer but
more variable than those for the electrical services, though the number of people affected by
electric service outages in an earthquake is likely greater than those affected by gas service
outages.
The study also found an array of energy supply products that homeowners could invest and
operationalize to make their homes more resilient to withstand natural disasters and service
disruptions. In summary, the Stanford Fellow hopes this exploration will assist the community
further the conversations as it seeks to electrify and decarbonize homes to meet the climate
challenge while enhancing community resiliency.
BACKGROUND
Natural gas use in buildings and fossil fuel-based transportation are the two major sources of
emissions in Palo Alto. Decarbonizing these two sectors is critical to meet ing the community’s
climate goals. Though the community has chosen the path of electrifying these two sectors with
Palo Alto’s carbon neutral electric supplies, questions arise regarding the resiliency impact of
relying on electricity as the single energy source and weaning from natural gas appliances and
internal combustion engines vehicles (ICE vehicle). This report summarizes the exploration and
findings on the relative resiliency of a mixed fuel versus all-electric single-family home.
4
The study defines reliability to be “how frequently and for what duration customers experience
energy service outages absent a major emergency“ and resiliency to be “the ability to prepare
for and adapt to changing conditions and to withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions.”1
Therefore reliability mainly deals with high probability low consequence events that focus on
impact to the systems while resiliency deals with low probability high consequence hazards that
focus on measuring impacts to humans. In ordinary use these two terms are not so clearly
distinguishable, but the distinction was useful for this study.
The study was composed of the following steps, in which the Fellow:
A. Undertook a home appliance survey which categorized the capability of appliance
operation during electricity and natural gas service disruptions
B. Explored the electric vehicle (EV) options available, vehicle range, and ability to provide
back-up electricity to homes in comparison to internal combustion engine vehicles (ICE
vehicles)
C. Estimated electricity use of a mixed fuel home in Palo Alto compared to a fully-electrified
home, with one EV.
D. Researched ways to enhance the resiliency of a home in the event of service disruption or
natural disaster scenario
E. Explored the relative frequency and duration of electricity versus natural gas service
outages and service restoration times under: a) normal operating conditions, b) earthquake
scenario, c) electrical outage in Palo Alto only, d) cyber attack.
DISCUSSION
A. Home Appliance Survey and Appliance Ability to Operate During Service Disruptions
Appendix A provides a full list of common natural gas appliances and electric alternatives.
In the appliance assessment, the Fellow worked with City staff to review all of the appliances
used in a home and categorized them by energy dependencies. The team then the measured
impact of electrical outages on the homeowner, based on outage duration for each appliance.
The study found that:
The major uses of electricity in a home are for:
i. Refrigerators and freezers
ii. Air Conditioning
iii. Lighting
iv. TV, PC, and Office Equipment
v. Dishwashers
vi. Cooking
vii. Electric Vehicles
1 Resilience Metrics for the Electric Power System: A Performance -Based Approach (comacloud.net)
5
The major uses of natural gas in a home are for:
i. Space Heating
ii. Water Heating
iii. Cooking
iv. Laundry
v. Pool and Spa Heating
From the appliance assessment the team found that:
1. The main appliances that required natural gas to run were space heaters, water heaters,
stoves/ovens, clothes dryers, and pool heaters.
2. Only tank gas water heaters and gas stoves would work during a power outage since
other appliances require electricity to power fans, pumps, igniters or other necessary
electronics.
a. That means that gas powered space heating, clothes drying, pool heaters, tankless
gas water heaters, and ovens will be inoperable during electricity outages.
b. None of the electrically powered space heating, water heating, cooking, and
clothes drying appliances would work during an electrical outage. It is worth
noting that although they will not heat additional water during an outage, electric
water heaters with tanks, both electric heat pump and traditional electric water
heaters will have between 1-2 days of hot water stored, depending on usage and
hot water level at time of outage.
3. Stoves would require ignition by hand during a power outage since they normally operate
with an electronic igniter. Stoves have required ventilation which need electricity to
operate in a safe and healthy way. Though some people may cook without using their
hood fans, cooking indoors without proper hood fans can lead to long term health
impacts, and a 2016 EPA integrated science assessment2 noted there was some evidence
linking NO2 exposure to asthma attacks, so even during a short outage some people may
need to avoid the use of gas stoves without an operational fan.
4. Traditionally electronic appliances will not operate during a power outage unless they
have battery capabilities like phones and laptops which then have a limited use time until
charge runs out.
B. Electric Vehicles (EVs) vs Internal Combustion Engine Vehicles (ICE vehicles)
Another important fuel source that most Palo Alto households rely on is gasoline for
transportation. While many people believe that having a gasoline powered car adds another
resiliency layer to a home it might not be as resilient as is commonly assumed.
The team found that:
2 U.S. EPA. Integrated Science Assessment (ISA) for Oxides of Nitrogen – Health Criteria (Final Report, Jan 2016).
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC, EPA/600/R-15/068, 2016.
https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/isa/recordisplay.cfm?deid=310879 , link retrieved September 3, 2021.
6
1. Gasoline systems also rely on electricity to operate and cannot run without it.
a. Gas stations use electric pumps to pull gasoline out of the underground storage
tanks and rely on electricity powered measurement equipment to determine how
much gas customers are buying.
b. A majority of gas stations in the city have to be refilled every day so during a large
disaster scenario, if large tanker trucks cannot make their way to the gas stations,
they cannot be refilled
2. A majority of gas stations in CA do not have back-up generators for pumping gas
a. Only a few states such as Florida, New York, and Louisiana began mandating backup
generators at gas stations due to events such as Superstorm Sandy and Hurricane
Katrina.
3. EVs and ICE vehicles have a similar range of 300 miles on a full tank/full charge
a. Assuming that all vehicles have on average 50% fuel capacity at any given moment
gives EV and ICE vehicle vehicles 150 miles of range during an outage
4. Gasoline can be stored cheaply and for long periods of time unlike electrical storage,
however storing gasoline at home is uncommon and can be a dangerous fire hazard
5. Plug in Hybrid Electric Vehicles (PHEV) can use both electricity and gasoline which
provides more flexibility but only have a small battery storage capacity and then have the
same downsides as ICE vehicles
6. Having an electric vehicle with rooftop solar and storage can add resiliency to the home.
a. Rooftop solar and storage can allow customers to self-generate their own electricity
even when the grid is down and gas stations are unable to pump gas.
7. In resiliency terms the team conclude that ICE vehicles and EVs are equal unless you have
a solar + storage option in which case EVs are much more resilient since they can continue
to be charged during an outage
8. EVs also could potentially serve as an electricity backup system utilizing vehicle to home
(V2H).
a. This would allow electric vehicles to provide about 40 – 80 kWh of backup power to
homes which can provide full power to a home from 1 – 3 days at a much cheaper
cost than traditional home battery storage.
b. However, most EVs do not have V2H backward charging capabilities yet, so this
benefit won’t be useful until that operability is created.
C. Electricity Use of Mixed Fuel Homes Versus All Electric Homes
Appendix B provides energy uses for an average CA Home using data from the 2019 Residential
Appliance Saturation Survey (RASS 2019)3 and then a simulated electrified home from that data.
Appendix C provides energy uses specifically from Palo Alto’s SFRs and then a simulated
electrified home from that data.
An important step in determining the resiliency of electrified homes is to compare the electricity
uses between traditional mixed fuel homes and fully electrified homes. This will be useful to
determine the effectiveness of certain resiliency measures such as solar + storage if a home fully
3 2019 California Residential Appliance Saturation St udy - Executive Summary pg. 3, 9
7
electrifies.
We have found that:
1. The average home in CA (RASS 2019) uses about 360 therms/yr and 6,174 kWh/yr. This
average includes both SFRs and multi-family residences (MFRs).
a. Over 90% of gas use is for space and water heating and about 50% of electricity is
used for refrigeration, air conditioning, and lighting.
2. After modeling an electrified home from the above RASS data , the team found that the
average electrified CA home would now use about 10,500 kWh/yr or 13,500 kWh/yr with
1 EV.
a. Those are increases in electricity use of about 70% and 120% respectively.
3. The average single-family residence (SFR) in Palo Alto uses about 600 therms/yr and 8,000
kWh/yr with a peak natural gas use of 110 therms/month in January and uniform
electricity use throughout the year.
4. After modeling an electrified home from the above Palo Alto SFR data the team found
that the average electrified Palo Alto SFR would now use about 12,500 kWh/yr (55%
increase) or 14,500 kWh/yr (80% increase) with 1 EV with a peak in January of 1,600
kWh/month and 1,800 kWh/month respectively.
D. Methods to Enhance the Energy Resiliency of Single-Family Homes in Palo Alto
Appendix D provides a list of energy resiliency options for homes that experience electrical
outages or loss in natural gas services.
First, the team determined if standard-sized solar + storage could meet 100% all of the needs of
a fully electrified home with EVs in the most adverse conditions, on a January day with highest
electricity needs and lowest solar generation . For all-electric homes in the Bay Area, the
recommended solar PV size is 6.5 kW, and given that Palo Alto single-family homes use more
energy than other homes in the Bay Area, our team assumed a 7.6 kW solar PV system and one
14 kWh battery (13.5 kWh usable). This is generally enough to provide 85-90% of annual energy
for the average all-electric with EV single-family Palo Alto home. Since the NEM 2.0 rate for excess
solar is lower in Palo Alto than in PG&E territory, further optimization around hourly usage and
building envelope is possible.
The team did an analysis for the month of January to simulate the most adverse month to have
an electrical outage, when the electrical load is highest, and the solar production is lowest. For
this scenario for the modelled home, the team found that:
1. The Peak daily consumption for a fully electrified + EV home in January could be around
1800 kWh/month or 60 kWh/day.
2. The daily solar production in January for a 7.6 kW system is 20.3 kWh/day, and with a
13.5 kWh battery this would meet or only 56% of energy needs, including charging the
EV.
a. This January scenario represents the most adverse conditions. Mid-February
through the October the system would provide roughly 100% of the energy needs.
b. For a 24-hour outage, the home owner could consider not charging their EV, and
8
or drawing down the hot water in their tank. If the home owner did not need to
charge their EV, about 62% of their energy needs would be met. If they chose to
not charge their EV and not to run their hot water tank (draw down the hot water
in their tank) roughly 78% of their needs would be met by this system, on a typical
January day.
3. If the goal is to provide 100% of the energy needs from solar and storage in January, a
homeowner could compare increasing the size of the solar array beyond 7.6 kW,
increasing the battery storage, or increase the energy efficiency and/or the insulation of
homes rather than purchasing a much larger solar array. A 15.3 kW PV system and single
13.5 kWh battery could produce the 55 kWh/day energy to meet the needs of the
modelled all-electric home if the EVs did not need to be charged during this 24-hour
outage. This solar PV system would provide 182% of the modeled home’s annual
electricity needs (including EV charging), so it would have very large over-generation. A
15.3 kW solar array requires about 1,090 square feet of roof space, on a moderately
complex roof. It is also worth noting that solar PV systems or generators over 10 kW in
size require additional approvals.
4. The size of the solar PV system and the potential cost and payback period depends on the
level of resiliency desired (e.g 100% of loads covered for a week-long outage in January),
efficiency of the home, roof shading, NEM 2.0 rate, and size of storage system. For homes
with inefficient building envelopes and shaded roofs, providing 100% of the needs of an
all-electric home from solar and storage onsite could be costly and potentially difficult.
The analysis the team found that solar + storage systems would need to be 7-15 kW solar PV and
one 13.5 kWh battery, for most of the current Palo Alto SFR building stock in order to provide
enough electricity supply for a home to be fully resilient throughout a 24-hour outage event,
depending on the season and weather. The home’s daily energy use would need to be curtailed
to match the daily solar production, buffered to some extent by storage. Larger solar arrays are
needed for all-electric homes, and single-family homes with shaded roofs and renters would be
challenged to install solar.
Listed below are further home energy resiliency options. A fuller description can be found in
Appendix D.
1. Rooftop Solar + Storage
2. Mobile Power Stations
3. Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS)
4. Solar Inverter System
5. Propane, Gasoline, and Natural Gas Backup Generators
6. Propane and Charcoal Cookware and Barbeques
7. Air Drying Clothes
8. Electric Vehicles (with home solar)
9
9. Biking
10. Vehicle to Home (V2H) charging
11. Community Microgrid
12. Smart Electrical Panels
13. Increased Home Energy Efficiency and Weatherization
14. Emergency Kit
E. Reliability Comparison of Palo Alto’s Electricity and Natural Gas Systems
Appendix E provides Palo Alto specific reliability statistics of SAIDI, CAIDI, and SAIFI for electrical
services and the corresponding imputed value for natural gas services.
The team first examined the reliability of Pao Alto’s electricity and natural gas systems using 11
years of natural gas outage data from 2011 to 2021 and 5 years of electricity outage data from
2015 to 2019. The results of those averaged data are shown below in the form of SAIDI, CAIDI,
and SAIFI.
System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) - Measure of the total duration of an
interruption for the average customer during a given time frame.
SAIDI = (Sum of Customer Minutes Interrupted) / (Total Customers Served)
System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI) - the average number of times a
customer will experience an interruption during a given time frame.
SAIFI = (Total Customers Interrupted) / (Total Customers Served)
Customer Average Interruption Duration Index (CAIDI) - the average time to restore service.
CAIDI = (Sum of Customer Minutes Interrupted) / (Total Customers Interrupted)
Table 1: Palo Alto’s Natural Gas and Electricity Service Reliability Statistics
Yearly SAIDI, CAIDI, and SAIFI Reliability Metrics Natural Gas Electricity
SAIDI (min/ # total customers) 0.95 74.9
CAIDI (min/ # interrupted customers) 124 151
SAIFI (# interrupted customers/ # total customers) 0.0073 0.52
In Table 1 above the team can see that all three of the SAIDI, CAIDI, and SAIFI measurements are
lower for the natural gas grid than for the electrical grid showing that for reliability, there are
fewer interruptions to natural gas customers than for electricity customers. The average Palo
Alto natural gas customer has on average 1 minute of interruption per year in gas service while
the average electricity customer has on average 75 minutes of interruption per year for electricity
service. Or using SAIFI, on average there are 7 gas interruptions each year for every 1000
customers in Palo Alto, while there are over 500 electric interruptions for every 1000 customers.
The average gas interruption lasts for about 2 hours, while the average electric interruption lasts
about 2.5 hours.
This shows that under normal operating conditions the electricity system experiences many more
outages compared to natural gas supply system. The City of Palo Alto Utilities natural gas is much
10
more reliable than electricity during normal operating conditions.
Power outages can especially impact customers that relied on home electrically powered medical
equipment, in which case having small portable power station could meet those short term
outage needs.
F. Resiliency Comparison of Palo Alto’s Electricity and Natural Gas Systems
Appendix F provides an analysis into the three outage scenarios chosen for this study which
includes why the team chose those specific scenarios, background information about the
scenarios, and more in-depth impacts of each.
The three outage scenarios chosen for the resiliency study of Palo Alto’s natural gas and
electricity services include:
1. Earthquake scenario
a. Modeled from the USGS Haywired Earthquake Study (primary focus for this study)
2. Palo Alto localized power outage scenario
a. Due to the failure of all three transmission lines serving Palo Alto
3. Cyberattack scenario
a. Potential Power loss to all of the WECC
The major findings on Palo Alto’s energy resiliency from those scenarios include:
1. The resiliency differences between a mixed energy use home and fully electrified home
are inconclusive for an earthquake scenario since recent reports and studies still lack
extensive data on specific infrastructure fragility models.
2. For an earthquake scenario in Palo Alto (and from past earthquake events), natural gas
system outages initially affect fewer people than electrical outages but would take much
longer to restore the affected natural gas customers than impacted electricity customers.
a. Northridge Earthquake: 1.4 million people initially lost power but 50% of
customers got back power after 8 hours and power was fully restored after 3 days
except for 7,500 customers, while it took 12 days to restore service to the 120,000
impacted natural gas customers.
b. Loma Prieta Earthquake: 1.4 million customers initially lost power but a majority
regained power within 7 hours and all but 12,000 customers had power within 2
days, while it took 9 days to restore natural gas service to 150,000 impacted
customers. While there were 1,000 pipeline leaks due to the earthquake, a
majority of the gas restoration time was due to the need for customer pilot light
relights.
3. Palo Alto’s natural gas system would recover much faster than the surrounding Bay
utilities natural gas systems due to the smaller size of Palo Alto, and the higher number
of natural gas valves, making it easier to isolate leaks for repairs.
4. Above ground power lines are more susceptible to non-earthquake natural disasters than
below ground power lines and the natural gas infrastructure system.
5. The duration of the utility outage is extremely important to determine the impact an
outage can have on residents during natural disasters.
11
6. Looking into the resiliency of the gasoline system the team found that “Damage to marine
terminals, oil refineries, fuel storage tanks, fuel transmission lines, and fuel dispensaries
is likely in a large San Francisco Bay region earthquake. As a result, there will likely not be
enough transportation fuel supplies available after a large earthquake.” 4
7. The City and County of San Francisco Lifelines Restoration Performance Improvement
Plan had a few important conclusions and recommendations including:
a. Restoration of many systems can be further improved by adding backup
generators or solar + battery storage systems.
b. It is recommended to reduce reliance on petroleum fuel to increase the
restoration of all systems and increase reliance on solar + storage for
transportation
• The bay area relies on Kinder Morgan fuel pipelines and Bay Area refineries
for gasoline which are more susceptible to damage and have much longer
restoration times. During a large earthquake event, transportation
capabilities can be cut off to the whole region.
c. The San Francisco Department of Building Inspection should require all new
building to be fully electric and should require the electrification of all existing
buildings with gas shutoff valves as an interim measure.
d. The full restoration of the natural gas system can take up to 6 months because of
the time it will take to integrity test the lines prior to depressurizing , and the
number of qualified personnel required to relight pilot light s.
e. Natural gas is primarily dependent on electric power and communications for
remote operation of gas shutoff valves and is also critically dependent on the road
network to access manual gas shutoff valves and repair damaged pipes.
• However, the vast majority of gas regulation and control equipment are
not affected by power outages as they are mechanical devices that are
powered by pressure in the gas system.5
8. The CPAU has 4 connection points or (Gas Gates) and two separate gas transmission
pipelines from PG&E coming into the city. Since there are 4 connection points and 2 pipes
from PG&E, a single point of failure is not likely to cause natural gas shutoffs for the city.
In comparison Palo Alto has 3 electricity transmission lines, which all pass through one
corridor. Therefore, if there is a disaster event in that one location, all of Palo Alto’s
electricity supply is vulnerable.
9. Transmission line loss into Palo Alto is still a major issue that could cause a power outage
to all of Palo Alto from 12 hours to 3 days.
a. This type of outage would not directly affect the natural gas system so mixed
energy use homes would fair better, except for fully electrified homes with ample
solar + storage.
b. Since this is a localized incident, residents could drive out of the city to refill their
gas, buy groceries, food, and medical supplies as needed.
4 G. Schremp, California Energy Commission, written commun., 2018
5 70_Lifelines-Report_1020.indd (onesanfrancisco.org)
12
10. A cyberattack scenario would be similar to a transmission line loss scenario for Palo Alto
except that the cyberattack scenario can affect much larger grid systems (potentially
shutting down all of the WECC) and can last from weeks to months. The gas distribution
will most likely not be affected.
a. The much longer power outage duration and larger area affected means people
would no longer be able to simply leave Palo Alto to buy food, gasoline, or access
WIFI since the whole grid will be down.
b. While mixed energy use home would fair slightly better in this scenario due to
having a working stove and water heater, they would face the same issues as fully
electrified homes in terms of space heating, cooling, transportation, refrigeration,
and WIFI.
G. CPAU Initiatives to Enhance Energy Reliability and Resiliency
While CPAU is undertaking a number of initiatives to maintain and enhance the community’s
energy resiliency, additional measures may also be explored, albeit it may be technically and
economically challenging to implement them.
CPAU resiliency initiatives that are underway or being discussed include:
1. Adding a second set of electric transmission lines into the city
2. Undergrounding overhead electric distribution lines (reducing risks from wildfires,
branches, and animals), though this process is currently on a very slow timeline.
3. Replacing distribution PVC natural gas pipes with more flexible and resilient PE pipes
4. Routine replacement of ageing infrastructure
5. Fund efficiency/weatherization measures through rebates
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
1. Though many might assume that a natural gas + electric (mixed fuel) home will be more
resilient than a fully electrified home due to having multiple fuel sources, this might not
be so in many cases
A. Many natural gas appliances need electricity to function (or cannot operate safely
without it) during an electricity outage
• Only gas stove tops and some gas tank water heaters will be operational
while most gas space heating, gas dryers, gas tankless water heaters,
and gas ovens will not work. Note: All water heaters with tanks will have
between one to two days of hot water in the tank
B. In the immediate aftermath of an earthquake, the electric system tends to
experience more widespread disruption but can recover faster than natural gas
C. After an earthquake, damaged natural gas infrastructure takes longer to repair,
and gas service restoration times have been more variable across events than
electric restoration times.
D. During a Palo Alto electric only outage scenario, a mixed energy use home could
be more resilient. It could potentially be less costly to add backup power to a
mixed energy use home.
13
2. Energy resiliency in both mixed fuel and all-electric homes could be enhanced with a wide-
array of products
A. Simple and low-cost products such as small battery packs to propane/gasoline
electric generators to outdoor propane barbeques
B. Higher cost solutions such as large solar + storage systems or large 20 kW natural
gas powered stationary generators
3. The reliability (absence of short-term outages caused by standard non-disaster incidents)
is much higher for natural gas services than electricity services
A. Reliability issues are life-threatening for customers who rely on medical devices,
and small portable batteries could be enough to mitigate this issue
4. The relative resiliency of electricity vs natural gas infrastructure in an earthquake is still
inconclusive:
A. Overhead powerlines sway and can cause immediate outages due to circuits
tripping, but service could be restored in short-order
B. Underground infrastructure is prone to ground movement and damaged natural
gas systems take much longer to restore than damaged underground or overhead
electricity systems
C. Most delays in natural gas restoration time is due to pilot relights
5. The resiliency of EVs is equal or better than ICE vehicles
A. Range of EVs are currently similar to ICE vehicles and the level of fuel in the car
can be similar for both
B. Gas stations cannot function in the event of an electrical outage and most do not
have backup generators
C. EVs at home could be charged with a solar PV system
6. A standard-sized 7.6 kW PV system with one 13.5 kWh battery is enough to meet the needs
of a fully electrified home nine months out of the year, and could meet 62-78% of the
needs in January (not including charging the EV). A customer would need a large 15.3 kW
PV system to meet the daily needs of the home modelled in January)
7. Transmission line loss scenarios and cyberattack scenarios would be more harmful to fully
electrified homes than for mixed energy use homes.
A. However fully electrified homes with ample solar and storage would likely be the
most resilient in this and other major disasters.
AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This study only began to delve into the complex tradeoffs between the resiliency of the natural
gas and electricity system, and the following areas below would yield very important information
for further research.
1. Examine costs more thoroughly for resiliency improvement options for mixed energy and
all-electric homes.
2. Explore and incorporate resiliency, social, fiscal, health, and climate change metrics to
better compare the consequences that electrification of SFRs can have
3. Overlay the GIS Haywired Scenario model onto Palo Alto’s natural gas and electricity
systems (or other natural disaster models) to determine more accurate damage scenarios
14
to estimate restoration times
4. Continue to examine, with a more focused scope, the resiliency differences between
mixed energy used homes and fully electrified homes due to cyberattacks
5. Calculate the impact of building envelope improvements on energy use and resiliency
6. Determine costs and resiliency benefits of adding backup generators to gas stations
7. Explore the costs and resiliency benefits of adding solar and storage at major employers
8. Examine the costs and resiliency benefits of adding backup gas generators around the city
and determine the best locations for those generators if cost effective
15
APPENDICES
Appendix A: Appliance Characterization
The following appliance matrix results are assuming a power outage for homes with no backup
solar + storage systems.
Methodology
Impact levels:
The impact of electricity outages of varying durations on residential customers was noted for
each appliance. The impact was denoted using 5 levels and their corresponding colors:
None: The customer would feel no impact or change in service during an outage: Green
Low: The customer would feel little to no impact from outage and would not have to
change daily activities: Yellow
Moderate: The customer would feel some impact from outage and would have to change
daily activities. Might not be able to use certain appliances for a time but no major
inconveniences: Orange
High: The customer would feel a great impact during a power outage. This would include
major inconveniences causing delays in productiveness, monetary loss, or difficulty in
utilizing appliances that are necessary to support everyday needs: Red
Extremely High: The customer would be extremely impacted during a power outage. This
would include life threatening situations and prolonged lack of access to everyday needs :
Purple
Impact characterization:
The levels of impact characterization were defined by three key factors, which include:
1. Frequency of appliance use
2. Ability of appliance to self-sustain itself for periods of time (i.e. thermal water
storage, battery storage)
3. Importance in meeting customer’s basic life needs
Other factors that were not considered for this initial analysis but may play an important role
include: the customer’s location, age, personal preferences and life habits, time of day,
season/weather, vulnerable populations vs general population… etc. Therefore, this impact
rating from “low” to “extremely high” can be seen as subjective and situational , so in this case it
is more of a rough initial guide since impact can change from person to person.
Table A1: Space Heating
In Table A1 below, the team can see the impact that power outages have on residential
customer’s with regards to space heating. We found that in the event of a power outage most
heating systems, including both natural gas and electric systems, will not operate. This is a
---
■
-
16
surprising finding since it is commonly believed that natural gas heating systems can operate
without electricity, however the team found this to be incorrect. We found that both the central
gas (forced air) furnace and the radiant heating (gas boiler) systems, which both use natural gas,
could not operate in the event of a power outage since they require electric fans and pumps
respectively to move the fluids in the heating systems. This was found to be similarly true with
regards to the electric heating systems which include electric resistance, packaged terminal heat
pumps, central (ducted forced air) heat pumps, and minisplit heat pumps, which also cannot
operate during a power outage.
Only two “heating” methods were found to operate during a power outage. The first is a natural
gas powered fan-less wall heater which can operate without electricity. However, this heating
method is extremely uncommon in single-family residential homes and more often found in
multifamily buildings. Because it uses stack ventilation, it does not require electricity and can
operate during a power outage. The second method is increasing the building’s envelope
insulation. This method work’s regardless of power being supplied to the building and can
simultaneously provide thermal resiliency during outages and save customers money on heating
and cooling costs throughout the year. However better insulation alone will not provide the full
capabilities of a heating system.
Since spaces have decent thermal resiliency to temperature (indoor temperature swings take
some time to occur), only after a 2-hour period does lack of heating begin to have consequences,
and the team can see that after 24 hours the impact can be High to Extremely High affecting
resident’s comfort and even health and safety depending on the climate zone and season. For
the impact assessments below, the outage is assumed to occur in winter.
It is important to note that electric heat pump heating systems are much more efficient that gas
systems (often 4 to 8 times more efficient), and most heat pumps with a COP (coefficient of
performance) of 3.5 or higher allow for cheaper heating that their gas counterparts.
17
Space Heating
Working
During
Outage?
Safe to
Operate
in
Outage?
Impact:
10 Min
Outage
2 Hour
Outage
24 Hour
Outage
1 Week
Outage
Central Gas
Furnace (forced
air);
Radiant Heating
(Gas Boiler)
No (requires
electric fans
or pumps
respectively)
N/A None Moderate High Extremely
High
Electric
Resistance;
Packaged
Terminal Heat
Pumps;
Central Heat
Pump (Ducted
Forced Air);
Mini Split Heat
Pump
No N/A None Moderate High Extremely
High
Fan-less Wall
Heater
(multifamily)
Yes
Yes (only
if no
blockage
in stack
venting)
None None None None
Better Envelope
Design
(Increased
Insulation)
Yes (But will
not provide
full warming
capabilities
of heating)
Yes None None None None
Table A2: Water Heating
In Table A2 below, the team can see the impact that a power outage has on various methods of
residential water heating. It was found that only one method of water heating (namely a gas tank
water heater) would work in the event of a power outage. The gas tankless water heater is una ble
to work during a power outage since it requires an electric pump. Furthermore, all of the electric
heating options including electric resistance tankless, electric resistance tank, heat pump tank,
and solar thermal water heaters would not work during a power outage. Another thing to note
is that the thermal storage of hot water in heat tanks can last one to two days, so depending on
18
hot water usage, electric water heaters with tanks will provide a day or so of hot water. Similarly
to space heating, an electric water heat pump is much more efficient that its gas counterpart and
most Heat Pumps with a COP (coefficient of performance) of 3.5 or higher, allow for lower cost
heating that their gas counterparts.
Water
heater
Working
During
Outage?
Safe to
Operate in
Outage?
Impact: 10
Min
Outage
2 Hour
Outage
24 Hour
Outage
1 Week
Outage
Electric
Resistance
Tankless
Gas
Tankless
No;
Gas
Tankless
requires
electric
pumps
N/A None Moderate High High
Electric
Resistance
Tank;
Heat Pump
Tank;
Solar
Thermal
Water
Heating
No (has 40-
50 gal
storage);
Solar
thermal
required
electric
pumps
N/A None None Moderate High
Gas Tank
Yes (may
require
lighter)
Yes (only if
no
blockage
on venting)
None None None None
Table A3: Cooking
In Table A3 below, the team can see the different traditional gas appliances used for cooking and
their electric counterparts. For inside use the only appliance that will work during an outage is
the gas stove. However, because most gas stoves use electric lighters they will need to be lit by
hand with a match or lighter. Furthermore, even though gas stoves will continue to operate
during an outage, it is important to note that operating gas stoves during an outage could have
adverse health effects. This is due to the fact that all gas stoves must also be coupled with a
dedicated stove fan or hood range which need electricity to operate. These stove fans reduce the
amount of pollutants people breathe from the cooking combustion process, such as carbon
19
monoxide, oxides of nitrogen, combusted natural gas, smoke, and particulate matter. While
many of the effects of cooking without a fan or hood that the team is aware of take place over
the longer term, staff is aware of a 2016 EPA integrated science assessment noted there was
some evidence linking NO2 exposure to asthma attacks, so even during a short outage people
with lung conditions may need to avoid the use of gas stoves without an operational fan .6
Therefore, dedicated stove fans or hoods are especially important for natural gas systems.
Induction stoves are much more efficient than gas stoves, emit no indoor air pollutants from
fossil fuel combustion, and reduce the risk of fires and burns.
Another interesting finding is that while gas stovetops could operate during an outage, gas ovens
will not. Gas ovens will not operate since their self-lighting feature also relies on electricity, is
usually difficult to access, and requires ventilation as well. Other options that could work during
a power outage are barbeque grills (propane, charcoal, or cordless electric). However, it is
important to note that all three of these grill options must be operated outside to decrease the
risk of carbon monoxide poisoning and inhalation of other pollutants that are created in the
combustion/cooking process.
It is important to note that over the longer term, induction cooktops are a healthier option. As
noted in the April 2020 Zero Emissions All-Electric Single-Family Construction Guide by Redwood
Energy, “gas stoves cause unhealthy level of nitrous oxides that would be illegal if it were a gas
power plant. After just twenty minutes of cooking and a sunny window, a kitchen can have actual
smog and trigger asthma. Furthermore, gas cooking appliances are 25-40% efficient while electric
cooking appliances are 70-90% efficient, so electric cooking uses 1/3 the energy and require 1/3
as much cooling.”7
6 U.S. EPA. Integrated Science Assessment (ISA) for Oxides of Nitrogen – Health Criteria (Final Report, Jan 2016).
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC, EPA/600/R-15/068, 2016.
https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/isa/recordisplay.cfm?deid=310879 , link retrieved September 3, 2021.
7 SF-Guide-4-10-2020.pdf (fossilfreebuildings.org) pg. 44
20
Cooking
Working
During
Outage?
Safe to
Operate in
Outage?
Impact:
10 Min
Outage
2 Hour
Outage
24 Hour
Outage
1 Week
Outage
Gas Stove
Yes
(requires
lighter)
No
(requires
electric
ventilation)
None None None None
Electric Stove;
Induction Stove;
Electric Oven;
Gas Oven
No N/A Low Low High Extremely
High
Barbeque grill-
Propane/Charcoal Yes Yes (must
be outside) None None None None
Barbeque grill-
Electric
Yes (if
cordless) N/A None None Low Moderate
Table A4: Clothes Drying
Table A4 below shows that both gas and electric clothes drying will not work during a power
outage. This is because gas dryers still need electricity for turning the laundry and operating other
electronic aspects of the device. However traditional methods like airdrying with a clothesline
could be a viable alternative.
It is important to note that “while washing machines and clothes dryers use about the same
amount of motor energy per load, boiling the water out of wet laundry uses 81% of all the energy
in an average laundry load when using a standard 30% efficient gas dryer vs a 250% efficient
electric heat pump dryer.”8
8 SF-Guide-4-10-2020.pdf (fossilfreebuildings.org) pg. 46
21
Clothes
Dryer
Working
During
Outage?
Safe to
Operate in
Outage?
Impact: 10
Min
Outage
2 Hour
Outage
24 Hour
Outage
1 Week
Outage
Gas;
Electric
No N/A Low Low Moderate High
Air Dry
(clothesline)
Yes (takes
longer
than with
dryer)
N/A None None None None
Table A5: Transportation
Many people believe that an electrified society (one that relies solely on EVs for transportation),
will be less resilient to one that relies on gasoline. However, the team found that the majority of
gas stations also rely on electricity to pump out gasoline and operate the credit card systems.
Most of these gas stations do not have backup generators and would therefore also heavily rely
on electrify to operate effectively. Therefore ICE vehicles, HEVs, PHEVs, and EVs would have to
operate with the level of gasoline/battery they have until the electricity is up and running again.
However, for a home with solar + storage, EV’s can be charged during a power outage whereas
ICE vehicles would require gas stations to be operational and would require tanker trucks (that
also rely on gasoline) to transport the fuel to the stations. That further means that if key
transportation infrastructure is down (such as highways and traffic lights), gas stations might not
be able to refuel if tanker trucks cannot bring in the fuel to the gas stations. The regional fuel
infrastructure also has vulnerabilities. The San Francisco Lifelines Study noted the potential for
fuel shortages in the wake of a major earthquake.9
Other transportation options to explore are public transportation. Gasoline buses feel the same
affects as ICE vehicle passenger vehicles and rely on pumps to be operational. Electric buses and
subways (BART) also require electricity and might not be operational during an outage unless
large amounts of solar or backup generation is available. Electric bikes which, need very little
charge, or traditional bicycles that run on human power can be resilient alternatives during an
outage, especially for Palo Alto which is known for being an extremely pedestrian and bike
friendly city.
9 City and County of San Francisco Lifelines Council, Lifelines Interdependency Study Report, April 17, 2014
https://sfgov.org/sfc/sites/default/files/ESIP/Documents/homepage/LifelineCouncil%20Interdependency%20Study_
FINAL.pdf
22
Transportation
Working
During
Outage?
Safe to
Operate
in
Outage?
Impact:
10 Min
Outage
2 Hour
Outage
24 Hour
Outage
1 Week
Outage
ICE vehicle's;
HEV’s:
PHEV’s
Yes (if gas
pumps are
operational)
Yes None None Low Extremely
High
EV's
Yes (limited
by charge
capacity)
Yes None None Low Extremely
High
Biking Yes Yes None None None None
Public
Transportation
Yes (if gas
pumps are
operational);
No if require
electricity
Yes None None Low High
Table A6: Fireplaces
For homes with fireplaces, the team found that gas and wood fireplaces will operate during an
outage but will require manual lighting and are only safe to operate if no electrical ventilation is
needed (i.e. has a proper stack ventilation fireplace). Electric fireplaces will not be operational.
Electric fireplaces are “swirling fire-like mist lit with LED’s that are less expensive than gas
fireplaces, safer, and cleaner. They provide heat in a smokeless way and can warm spaces up to
800 square feet.”10
Fireplaces
Working
During
Outage?
Safe to
Operate in
Outage?
Impact:
10 Min
Outage
2 Hour
Outage
24 Hour
Outage
1 Week
Outage
Gas;
Wood
Yes (requires
lighter)
Yes (if no
electrical
ventilation
needed)
None None None None
Electric No N/A Low Low Low Moderate
10 SF-Guide-4-10-2020.pdf (fossilfreebuildings.org) pg. 49
23
Table A7: Pools and Hot Tubs
During a power outage both natural gas and electric pool heaters will not operate. This is because
they also rely on electric pumps to circulate the water and there is no self -ignition option for
natural gas pool heaters which rely on electrical ignition.
Pools and
Hot Tubs
Working
During
Outage?
Safe to
Operate in
Outage?
Impact: 10
Min
Outage
2 Hour
Outage
24 Hour
Outage
1 Week
Outage
Natural
Gas
No
(ignition;
pumps)
N/A None None Low Moderate
Electric No N/A None None Low Moderate
Table A8: Yard Tools
All yard tools that rely on diesel or gasoline will be operational during an outage. All cordless
electric tools will be operational but will only last up until their battery runs out (which usually
means a few hours of yard work available).
Yard Tools
Working
During
Outage?
Safe to
Operate in
Outage?
Impact: 10
Min
Outage
2 Hour
Outage
24 Hour
Outage
1 Week
Outage
Blower-
gas;
Trimmer
gas;
Lawn
Mower -
Gas
Yes Yes None None None None
Blower-
electric;
Trimmer-
electric;
Lawn
Mower -
Electric
Yes (if
cordless) Yes None None Low Low
24
Table A9: Traditionally Electric Appliances
Now that the team has discussed the different options and resiliency affects between similar
home appliances that use varying fuel sources, the team will also explore appliances that are
traditionally electric only. The team found that all of these appliances will not work during an
outage unless they are cordless and have their own battery storage such as laptops, phones,
some hair dryers, and hair trimmers. These devices range from extremely impactful if
functionality is lost to very low impact. Devices such as refrigerators, fans, toasters, microwaves,
lights, WIFI, and phone access are extremely important to save and prepare food, contact
emergency assistance, or work from home. Many of these appliances such as hair dryers, electric
razors, and clothes irons are not life threatening or high impact if power is lost. Refrigerators can
stay cold for up to 4 hours and freezers can stay cold for up to 24 hours without electricity.
25
Electric Only
Appliances
Working
During
Power
Outage?
Safe to
Operate
in Power
Outage?
Impact:
10 Min
Outage
2 Hour
Outage
24 Hour
Outage
1 Week
Outage
Refrigerator No N/A None None High Extremely
High
Plug in Kitchen
Hot Water Heater No N/A Low Moderate High Extremely
High
Microwave No N/A Low Moderate High Extremely
High
Toaster No N/A Low Moderate High Extremely
High
Blender No N/A Low Moderate High Extremely
High
Fans No N/A Low Moderate High Extremely
High
Washing Machine No N/A Low Low Moderate High
TV No N/A Low Low Moderate High
Laptops/Desktops Yes (if
cordless) Yes None None Moderate High
Phones Yes (if
cordless) Yes None None Moderate High
WIFI/Internet No N/A High Extremely
High
Extremely
High
Extremely
High
Lights No N/A High Extremely
High
Extremely
High
Extremely
High
Electric Reclining
Chairs/Beds
(nonmedical)
No N/A Low Low Low Moderate
Clothes Iron No N/A Low Low Low Moderate
Hair Dryer Yes (if
cordless) Yes Low Low Low Moderate
Trimmer/Electric
Razor
Yes (if
cordless) Yes Low Low Low Moderate
Portable Air
Conditioner No N/A None Low High Extremely
High
26
A10: Home Medical Devices:
We find that many home medical devices rely on electricity and the team would recommend
having a backup power supply for these important devices. We would recommend having a small
to midsized portable energy storage device in case the resident needs to evacuate their home,
and also a larger home storage and PV system to provide continuous power throughout longer
duration emergency events.
27
Appendix B: RASS Energy Use Data
We can see the breakdown of energy uses for the average CA home in Figure B1 below which
was created by data taken from the 2019 RASS (Residential Appliance Saturation Study). The 2019
RASS report shows that the average CA home uses around 360 therms/yr of natural gas mostly
for space and water heating and uses around 6,200 kWh/yr mostly for refrigeration, AC, lighting,
and other appliances. These energy consumptions are useful to gain a general sense of where
energy is being used in a home, however since these are California averages natural gas use will
be lower than for Palo Alto due to Southern CA having much lower gas demand. Furthermore,
for Palo Alto this study focused on single-family residences (SFR’s) so these averages, which also
include apartments, will be lower than Palo Alto SFR averages.
Figure B1: CA Average Home Energy Uses from the Residential Appliance Saturation Survey11
The pie charts in Figure B2 below, show the energy use for approximated electrified average CA
homes with and without 1 EV respectively.
Figure B2: CA Average Electrified Home Energy Uses
The following assumptions were used for the electrification approximation shown above in Figure
B2:
1. Used RASS 2019 Data for CA mixed energy use
2. Assumed Electric heat pumps for space and water heating have a COP of 3
11 2019 California Residential Appliance Saturation Study - Executive Summary
Natural Gas Usage {360 therms/yr)
Electrified Home (10,323 kWh)
■ Dishwasher and
Cooking
■ Space Heating
■ Poo ls and Spas
Laundry
■ Water Heating
■ Refrigerators and freezers
■ Air Condiitioning
■ Lighting
■ TV, PC, Office Eqpmt
■ Di shwasher and Cooking
■ Space Heating
■ Pools and Spas
■ Laundry
■ Water Heating
■ Electric Vehicles
■ Miscellaneous
Electricity Usage (6,174 kWh/yr)
■ Refrigerators and freezers
■ Air Condiitioning
■ lighting
TV, PC, Office Eqpmt
• Dishwasher and Cooking
■ Space Heating
■ Pools and Spas
■ Laundry
■ Water Heating
■ Electric Vehicles
■ Miscellaneous
Electr ified Home with EV'S (13,690 kWh)
5%
:::!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Ill! 4%
3% 4%
■ Refrigerators and freezers
• Air Condiitioning
■ Lighting
■ TV, PC, Office Eqpmt
• Dishwasher and Cooking
• Space Heat ing
■ Pools an d Spas
■ Laundry
■ Water Heating
■ Elec t ric Vehicles
■ Miscellaneous
28
3. For the electric vehicle scenario, assumed an average household to have 1 EV
a. Assumed 12,000 miles travelled per year per vehicle
b. Assumed 3.5 mi/kWh vehicle efficiency
4. Assumed that other efficiency improvements created from switching natural to gas to
electric cooking, laundry, and pool heating were negligible and were not included. One
therm of gas use when electrified would consume 29.3 kWh assuming a 100% conversion
ratio with no changes in efficiency.
The bar chart in Figure B3 below, shows the increased electricity use from the mixed electricity
scenario to a fully electric scenario, to a fully electric scenario with 1 EV. We can see a 67%
increase from Mixed use (6,000 kWh/yr) to an Electrified home (10,500 kWh/yr). And there is a
120% increase from Mixed use (6,000 kWh/yr) to Fully Electric + EV’s (13,500 kWh/yr).
Figure B3: Bar Chart of CA SFR Electricity Use per Year
Figure B4 shows the combined electric, natural gas, and other fuel saturation for various
appliances in a CA home. We can see that space heating, water heating, clothes drying, ovens,
and stove ranges will be the primary targets for electrification. Furthermore, it is clear that a large
amount of clothes drying, ovens, and stove ranges are already electrified in the current CA home
stock.
"-ro
<J.)
>
"-
16000.0
14000.0
12000.0
w -
0.. ~ 10000.0
<J.) <J.)
V) > ::, ? 8000.0
-~ $ 6000.0 0~ ·--"-0 4000.0
<J.)
LU 2000.0
0.0
SFR Electricity Use per Year
M ixed (kWh) Fully Electric (kWh)
■ Miscellaneous
■ Electric Veh icles
■ Water Heating
■ Laundry
■ Pools and Spas
■ Space Heating
■ Dishwasher and Cooking
TV, PC, Office Eqpmt
■ Lighting
■ Air Condiition i ng
Fully Electric with EV'S ■ Refrigerators and freezers
(kWh)
29
Figure B4: Appliance Saturation for the Average CA Home from the RASS Report12
12 2019 California Residential Appliance Saturation Study - Project Overview pg. 14
Space Heating
Space Cooling
Wa ter Heat ing
Clothes Was her
Clolhes Dryer
Refr igerator
Freeze r
Dis hwas he r
Cooking. Oven
Cooking • Range
OU1doorBBO
Pool Pu°"
Pool Heating
Spa Healing
~
IE!il l '"'
m m,, ..
0% 10% 20%
• Electricity
'
30% 40%
Natura l Gas
-. .,.
....
-••1"'
"
■ 2%
-3%
50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
•Other (Propane, Solar , Olller)
30
Appendix C: Palo Alto Energy Use Data
Figure C1 below shows Palo Alto’s actual natural gas and electricity usage for SFRs. These results
are averaged from Palo Alto individual SFR data from July 2019 to July 2021. I summed all of the
individual monthly energy uses and averaged them over the 2 year time period and
approximately 15,000 SFRs.
Figure C1: Annual Averaged Palo Alto Natural Gas and Electricity Use
We can see that the average Palo Alto SFR uses around 600 therms per year with highs in the
winter of 110 therms due to increased space and water heating and lows in the summer of 20
therms. We can further see that the electric demand for SFRs is constant throughout the whole
year with a total electricity use of around 8,000 kWh/yr with highs of 850 kWh/month in the
winter and lows of 600 kWh/month in the summer.
Figure C2: Palo Alto Electricity Use for an Electrified Home and Solar Generation
Now Figure C2 above on the left shows the combined energy demand from the previous two
graphs for an electrified home. The purple denotes new electricity use from electrified natural
gas appliances, and the green shows the electricity use for standard electric appliances where
the two combined become the total energy use for an electrified home. We can see that
electrifying the home increase the yearly energy usage from 8,000 kWh/yr to 12,500 kWh/yr
(55% increase) and increases the winter monthly peak from 850 kWh to 1,600 kWh.
" 0
Annual Averaged Palo Alto Gas Use per
household by month (614 therms/yr)
~ 120THM
" _g ai 100 THM
~§
5: ~ S0THM
:::, E
~ ~ ~ ~ 60THM
QI
bD
I!!
1
40THM
20THM
0THM
JU L AUG SE P OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN
Averaged Palo Alto Electricity Usage for Electrified
Home (12,500 kWh/yr)
"" 2,000
0 .re
~ 1,500
o
:,:: -;,; 1! 1,000
C. 0
-~~
.~ ~ 500
~'=-w
~
~ <r
0
JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN
■ Electricity Usage from Electrified Gas Applainces
■ Electricity usage from standa rd electric appliances
.,,
0
L
5: :,
0
:i:
;,;
Annual Averaged Palo Alto Electricity Use per
Household by month (8,028 kWh/yr)
l,DOO KWH
900 KWH
800 KWH
700 KWH
Q. ai 600 KWH 5l 5
:::lL 500 KWH >--...
.!:' ..c 400 KWH -s ~ u-300 KWH .,
w .,, .,
aD
I!! .,
> <t
200 ~WH
100 KWH
OKWH
JUL AU G SEP OCT NOV DEC JA N FEB MAR APR MAY JUN
Averaged Palo Alto Electricity Usage for
Electrified + EVs + Solar {14,526 kWh/yr)
"" 2,000
0 .re
~ 1,500
0
:,::_
i E 1,000 .?;
-~ ..i=. ~ i 500
w
~ ;,;
> <r
0
JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN
■Total+ EV's Averaged (kWh/household)
■ Rooftop Solar Generation
31
Finally, Figure C2 above on the right adds EV electricity demand and the total electricity demand
is in blue. The team also overlaid the rooftop solar generation for a 7.6 kW system in Palo Alto as
shown in orange. That means that all of the area left in blue is the home’s energy demand that
solar generation cannot meet. The total yearly energy use per SFR is now 14,500/yr (80%
increase) and the total solar generated is 12,350 kWh/yr, or 85% of the annual usage. Larger solar
PV systems can fit on most SFR homes, but might have longer payback periods depending on the
NEM 2.0 rate and the degree of onsite usage from smart devices.
The following assumptions were used for the electrification model shown above:
1. Assumed COP of 3.5 for heat pump water heater and space heating.
2. Also accounted for the fact that older gas furnaces had efficiencies of only around 70%.
3. Assumed that each home will have 1 Electric Vehicle
4. Assumed that 3,500 out of Palo Alto’s current 5,000 EVs were attributable to SFRs: so only
11,500 more EV’s were added (15,000-3,500=11,500)
5. Rooftop PV system is assumed to be 7.6 kW and energy output data is modeled using PV
Watts
Figure C3: Palo Alto Single-Family Home Monthly Electricity Use per Household
Figure C3 shows the electricity usage per month per household over various scenarios and can
see that the highest electricity demands will be during the winter across all three scenarios.
0.0
200.0
400.0
600.0
800.0
1000.0
1200.0
1400.0
1600.0
1800.0
2000.0
Average Maximum Minimum Winter Average Summer
Average
El
e
c
t
r
i
c
t
y
U
s
e
p
e
r
M
o
n
t
h
(k
W
h
/
m
o
n
t
h
/
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
)
Electricity Use by Month per Household
Mixed Use Home Fully Electrified Home Fully Electrified + EV's■ ■ ■
32
Appendix D: Home Energy Resiliency Measures
1) Rooftop Solar + Storage
Rooftop solar + storage is one of the most effective methods to increase a home’s resiliency.
While it is much more expensive than other resiliency methods such as gasoline generators, it
works year-round, saving money on energy bills and can provide fu ll-service coverage for mixed
energy use homes, and can meet most of the demand during the summer for electrified homes.
However, for electrified homes in Palo Alto during the winter, a 7.6 kW solar PV system with 13.5
kWh battery can only meet around 62% of energy demand and electrical storage will quickly be
used up.
Therefore, to be fully resilient off grid in the months of November through February, the solar
array must be scaled up past 7.6 kW and the home must be designed with more energy efficient
technologies to decrease the amount of solar needed. Home battery storage can have a storage
capacity of 10-14 kWh and can have a total product and an installation cost between $8000-
11,000. The average Palo Alto mixed energy home uses 20-30 kWh per day and a fully electrified
home uses 30-60 kWh per day with higher energy uses in the winter for space heating. Solar PV
systems of 15.5 kW or so will be required to make it through multiple days of outages if the home
energy efficiency are not increased.
Furthermore, cost of solar panels can vary on size and whether the product is being bought
outright or leased. Many people prefer the leasing option since they are not responsible for solar
panel damage and pay monthly lease installments that are often cheaper than their energy bills,
in affect saving money for no cost. The costly part of the system is the battery storage. Solar and
storage systems can currently be financed, because of the monthly energy savings, but the
minimum bill and NEM 2.0 rate of City of Palo Alto Utilities will extend the payback p eriod of
these systems.
33
2) Mobile Power Stations
Mobile power stations are another method to increase home resiliency. They are essentially large
movable battery packs, holding anywhere from 500 Wh - 2 kWh of electricity, that can run
between $200 and $600. These devices can be charged by p lugging into a wall outlet or with
small solar panels if off-grid. However, these battery packs cannot support a whole home which
uses 20-30 kWh/day for mixed use homes and 30-60 kWh/day for fully electrified homes. Mobile
power stations are perfect for charging small devices such as phones, laptops, small electric
cookstoves, small fans and other devices, or a single large appliance such as a refrigerator. Also,
since they are portable unlike large home battery storage, people can take them out of the house
if the home is unsafe and can continue to provide energy for their medical devices inside and
outside of the home as well.
3) UPS (uninterruptible power supplies)
Uninterruptible power supplies can also add to the resiliency of a home by providing a little more
backup storage and surge protection for sensitive devices. A UPS is traditionally connected to
WIFI routers, phones, laptops, desktops, and other small devices. While a UPS is relatively cheap
($50 to $300), it is usually meant for short term outages (more reliability focused than resiliency)
and can only support these small devices between 2 to 5 hours.
4) Solar Inverter Systems
34
13
Solar inverter systems are products that allow customers to utilize rooftop solar energy during
power outages without having battery storage. Rooftop solar either feeds into the grid or a home
battery system. If there is no home storage option and the grid is down, typical rooftop solar
won’t produce any energy for the home. However, solar inverter products such as the Sunny Boy
and Enphase Ensemble allow the solar energy to be directly sent to devices. However, these
inverter systems have a power draw capacity limit and can only send about 2 kW of electricity
which is enough to power small devices such as phones, laptops, two refrigerators, or a single
microwave/toaster oven, or a single burner on an induction stove. Therefore , it is often
recommended to purchase the home battery storage as well, due to the limited power cap of
these solar inverter systems. The cost of a solar inverter systems is about $1,500-$2,500 not
including the price of the solar panels and installation.
5) Propane, Gasoline, Natural Gas Backup Generators
Propane, gasoline, and natural gas backup generators can range from $300 with a 2kW mobile
capacity allowing one to power small appliances, to $3,000 with a 15kW mobile capacity allowing
one to power most of the home’s needs, finally to $5,500 with a 20 kW stationary capacity which
can fully meet the home’s needs but require 4 gallons propane/hour or 280 cubic feet of natural
gas/hour. The installed cost of the stationary generator is generally close to $10,000 or slightly
more. For those larger systems the fuel cost is about $3 to $15 per hour depending on the type
13 What Happens If You Have Solar And The Power Goes Out? (solarreviews.com)
Sunny Boy Inverters con provide up to
2 ,000 Wotts of "opportunity power,•
(20 Amps max) meaning your solar
panels can keep your most essential
electric needs running in the event of
a blackout!
35
of fuel used. Natural gas generators have a distinct advantage in that they can be connected
directly into the natural gas distribution lines in the home, which eliminates the need for refueling
since there will be a continuous supply of natural gas (unless the natural gas grid is out).
While these systems are substantially cheaper than solar + battery storage and more effective
that small mobile power stations, they do have their drawbacks. First off, the fuel costs are quite
expensive and unlike solar + storage, they do not provide revenue and other energy services
throughout the year. Furthermore, since they are burning fuel, they create harmful air pollution
(including CO2 emissions) and should always be used outsid e. Lastly, they are also more prone
to causing fires. In addition, only those generators which are wired directly into the electrical
panels (not mobile generators) will allow natural gas furnaces to heat a home, since the HVAC
system is powered from the panel and cannot be bypassed to run off of a mobile generator.
6) Propane and Charcoal Cookware and Barbeques
Propane and charcoal cookware (only when used outside due to indoor health threats including
fires and carbon monoxide poisoning) can be great resiliency tools to have during an outage. They
can be used for fully electrified homes in an outage or for mixed energy homes if the stove to p,
oven, microwave and toaster are not working. Since propane and charcoal can be easily stored
this is a simple and relatively cheap resiliency alternative.
36
7) Air Drying Clothes
When power is out, clothes dryers and washing machines will not work. People often forget that
clothes can be handwashed in the sink and air -dried outside on a clothesline without any power
use whatsoever.
8) Electric Vehicles
Electric vehicles, paired with solar and battery storage, are another important tool one can have
to increase their resiliency. Since a majority of gas stations require electricity to pump gas and
are usually refilled once per day from large tanker trucks that also require gas, having an electric
vehicle charged from home can provide transportation services that might have been incapable
with ICE vehicles.
37
9) Biking
During an outage, relying on mechanical human-powered energy such as biking is an extremely
cheap, resilient, healthy, and effective way to get from one place to another, if gas stations are
down and electric vehicles + battery storage + solar panels is too expensive.
10) Vehicle to Home (V2H) Charging
Vehicle to Home can potentially be a resiliency and electricity storage solution by using electricity
stored in an electric vehicle (EV) to power the home. Current electric vehicles can have battery
storage between 50 kWh and 100 kWh (40 to 80 kWh usable) which is enough to fully support a
home’s electricity needs from 1 to 4 days depending on the time of year and if the home is fully
electrified. The one vehicle is equivalent to having 3 to 6 battery storage units and can also be
used for transportation purposes. However, while this type of technology would provide
immense resiliency opportunities, it is not common in the US or compatible with most electric
vehicles, and is therefore not currently available, except for a few specific models such as the
Nissan Leaf.
38
11) Community Microgrid
A community microgrid could be another effective resiliency measure for homeowners who
might not be able to install solar panels on their own homes due to tree shading, structurally
weak roofs, or lack of home ownership. There are many ways one could implement a community
microgrid, and the concept requires more study to determine its feasibility and most effective
implementation in Pao Alto.
12) Smart Electrical Panels
Smart electrical panels allow battery systems to work much more effectively, letting th e
customer choose where energy is used in a home during outage situations if there is limited
battery supply. This allows the customer to prioritize their most important electricity needs if
they need to ration out their battery storage during an outage.
13) Increased home energy efficiency/weatherization
Energy efficiency and weatherization can be beneficial for a homeowner in 3 main ways. Firstly,
an energy efficient home and properly weatherized home requires less energy to function. This
means that during an outage, less solar and fewer backup storage batteries will be needed to
supply the home. It will be less costly and much simpler to power an energy efficient home with
solar throughout the whole duration of an outage. Secondly, properly weatherized and energy
efficient homes have better insulation and ventilation , and thereby can retain heat/coolth better
during power shutoffs when space heating and AC might not be operational. So, while a normal
home might begin to get cold in the winter after only 6 hours, a properly weatherized home with
good insulation might not change indoor temperature for 18 hours. Lastly since energy efficient
homes use less energy throughout the whole year, residents are continuously saving money
throughout the whole year, unlike a propane or gasoline generator, which does not provide any
sources of income or reduce electricity bills.
Doorbells Music
bnlhanr
39
14) Emergency Kit
A basic emergency kit that includes water, a flashlight, non-perishable food, a can opener, a space
blanket, a radio, and a can opener can be extremely useful to meet hydration, food, warmth,
communication and other safety needs during an outage.
BASIC DISASTER .
SUPPLIES KIT
~ can
whistle opener
.,.;f.... •< I
40
Appendix E: Reliability Comparison between Palo Alto’s Natural Gas and Electricity Service
System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) - Measure of the total duration of an
interruption for the average customer during a given time frame.
SAIDI = (Sum of Customer Minutes Interrupted) / (Total Customers Served)
System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI) - the average number of times a
customer will experience an interruption during a given time frame.
SAIFI = (Total Customers Interrupted) / (Total Customers Served)
Customer Average Interruption Duration Index (CAIDI) - the average time to restore service.
CAIDI = (Sum of Customer Minutes Interrupted) / (Total Customers Interrupted)
Figure E1 below, shows the SAIDI, CAIDI, and SAIFI of Palo Alto’s natural gas service.
Figure E1: SAIDI, CAIDI, and SAIFI of Palo Alto’s Natural Gas Service
Figure E2 shows the SAIDI, CAIDI, and SAIFI of Palo Alto’s electricity service.
SAIDI of Palo Alto's Natural Gas System
2.50
0.00
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
SAIFI of Palo Alto's Natural Gas Sysetm
l.60E-02
l.40E-02
l.20E-02
l.0OE-02
8.00E-03
6.00E-03
4.00E-03
2.00E-03
0.0OE+OO
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
CAIDI of Palo Alto's Natural Ga s System
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
41
Figure E2: SAIDI, CAIDI, and SAIFI of Palo Alto’s Electricity Service
These charts show that the natural gas service is much more reliable than the electricity service
for Palo Alto customers under normal circumstances.
2015 -2020 SAIDI and CAIDI
200.00
150.00
100.00
50.00
0.00 '-------------------------
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
~SAIDI ~CAIDI
(Minutes) (Minutes)
1.20
1.00
0.80
0,60
0.40
0.20 l
0,00
2015
2015-2020 SAIFI and MAIFI
2016 2017
~SAIFI ~MAIFI
2018
•
2019
42
Appendix F: Resiliency Comparison for Various Outage Scenarios
This report will mainly focus on outages due to an earthquake scenario; specifically the Haywired
Earthquake scenario which was a 7.0 earthquake with an epicenter in Oakland, CA modeled by
the USGS. The study also considered two other scenarios which include a Palo Alto specific outage
similar to the Plane Crash incident of February 2010 which took down all of the transmission lines
coming into Palo Alto which happen to be located in the same corridor, and a Cybersecurity event
which could potentially wipe out all of CA’s or even the whole WECC’s grid.
These three scenarios were chosen after considering data from the CBO North American Grid
Security paper and taking into account CA and Palo Alto specific threats. Figure F1 below shows
the likelihood of major threats on the y-axis with the estimated economic damage plotted on the
x-axis. The team decided to choose the Haywired earthquake scenario as this paper’s main focus
since Palo Alto lies in an earthquake prone area, and the likelihood and da mage from the event
are both medium to high.
Figure F1: Judgements About the Likelihood of Major Threats to the Grid and the Economic
Effects from the Loss of Power14
The Haywired Scenario
The Haywired Earthquake Scenario is a 2018 study led by the United Stated Geological Survey
(USGS) which anticipates the impacts of a hypothetical magnitude 7.0 earthquake on the
Hayward fault with the epicenter located in Oakland, CA on the East side of t he San Francisco
Bay. For the past 2,000 years scientists have documented a major earthquake occurring along
14 Enhancing the Security of the North American Electric Grid (cbo.gov) pg. 9
Judgments About the Likelihood of Major Threats to the Grid and the Economic Effects From the Loss of
Power
Ukelfhood
(Expected averagi?
occurrence)
High
(Averagi ng about one
every 10 years)
Medium
{Averagi ng about one
every 50 years)
Low
(Averag i ng aboUl one
every 100 years)
Very low
{Averag i ng abou1 one
every 150 vears or more)
Veryl.Dw
(llm"'eds of millions of
dollars or 1es.s)
lDw
(BIiiions of dollars or
lessl
Medium
{fens of balons
otdolarsl
Po1entia l Economic Effect
High
(Hundreds of
billions of dollars)
VetyHlgh
(A trillion dol~
ormore)
43
this fault every 150 ± 60 years. The last big earthquake on the Hayward Fault was in 1868, over
150 years ago.
Figure F2: Shaking and Damage Chart of Haywired Earthquake Scenario15
The geological impacts of the Haywired Earthquake include:
• Ground shaking
• Fault offsets or ground displacement of up to 6 feet (with slower displacement occurring
up to months after incident)
• Liquefaction
• Landslides
• Aftershocks as high as 6.5 (up to 2 years after main quake)
The casualties and losses from this event could include:
• 800 deaths and 18,000 nonfatal injuries from structural damage
o 2,500 people could require rescue from collapsed buildings
o 22,000 people could require rescue from stalled elevators.
• 77,000 (3% of Bay Area) displaced households due to structural building damage or
152,000 (6% of Bay Area) households displaced if including other factors such as utility
outages
• Of current building stock in the Bay Area:
o 0.4% could collapse
o 5% could be unsafe to occupy
o 19% could have restricted use
• $82 billion in property damage and business losses
o Most losses from shaking damage, then liquefaction, and finally landslides
15 SIR 2017-5013 v1.2: The HayWired Earthquake Scenario —Earthquake Hazards (usgs.gov) pg. 32
P.Klf/C
OU'..I\
D 10 lD
37' 10 l!I
EXPI.ANATION
S.aki ........... ......
Uodtn.fe
Wut
._fiul!IU.S.~
SM-,2!DI~ ---»...dp ..... -
44
In general Palo Alto is vulnerable to several natural disaster events including:
a. Earthquakes (main shaking, surface displacement, landslides, liquefaction, aftershocks)
b. Flooding
c. Wildfires
d. Sea Level Rise
Figure F3 shows Hazard Exposure Maps for Palo Alto. In the first image on the left, the white lines
depict the city limits of Palo Alto, the black lines depict important highways and freeways and the
blue dots depict other important infrastructure. We can see that all of Palo Al to is earthquake
prone, shown in orange and red. The northern side of Palo Alto, closer to the San Francisco Bay,
is more vulnerable to liquefaction, flooding, and sea level rise (and can affect areas that contain
important infrastructure), while the southern more hilly part of Palo Alto is more vulnerable to
landslides and wildfires. While southern Palo Alto contains less infrastructure at risk, wildfires
and landslides can still affect housing and distribution lines in the area.
Figure F3: Hazard Exposure Maps for Palo Alto16
16 Local Hazard Mitigation Plan – City of Palo Alto, CA
Seismic Hazard Risk Landslide Risk Liquefaction Risk
US 101
I-280
------
45
Figure F4 below from the Haywired Scenario shows the aftershocks simulated to occur. The
image on the left shows all of the simulated aftershocks which can occur up to 2 years after the
7.0 mainshock in Oakland. The graph on the right shows the largest of those aftershocks of which
a few affect Palo Alto. Those aftershocks that are mainly focused around Palo Alto and Menlo
Park can be as large as 6.5 magnitude earthquakes.
Figure F4: Simulated Aftershocks from Haywired Scenario17,18
17 SIR 2017-5013 v1.2: The HayWired Earthquake Scenario —Earthquake Hazards (usgs.gov)
18 SIR 2017-5013 v1.2: The HayWired Earthquake Scenario —Earthquake Hazards (usgs.gov) pg 23
Flood Risk Fire Severity Risk Sea Level Rise Risk
A
.......
fEIU.Flood Z4-. -· ---M -~ -~ -· -~
..
..... -br,."""'9'121114 ----1-
0INr--llS ----•C-.-us.a.,..._
-8. :r:: ...... .....
U-U
I • .II JIIQOM[lflll
~t,al5
_,..,
o w.., ..... o w..,_ o w..,...,
Q WilhooJ ............ -~ ..
---"'---_..,
~""'--~
.... ---
o.--i•111-.,11MU.S.6.....,...Str.e,¥1110i,1,1"'ne~01~1tllll!i:
~"lll'bnlJ.$.~~llo<GIIIIH .... D--,2(116
~--U.tC-...,_llllEJIUILJlllli
Nid,_.~Oaa1M•1a,UTM tl'fl llKlj!ll:a011,
c-•-•12rw.lmlded019",.DtrN
,.,_ . -·---□--ca. .... -----
-· -·
46
The biggest risks to Palo Alto for the Haywired scenario include
a. Ground Shaking
b. Liquefaction
c. Aftershocks
d. Loss of water, gas, and electricity due to loss of transmission outside of Palo Alto’s
boundaries
It was found that the natural gas distribution system, below ground electric distribution, and
aboveground electric distribution all have their own strengths and weaknesses with regards to
resiliency and speeds of recovery. Those findings are summarized below:
1. Overhead electric lines: Not as impacted by shaking damage and liquefaction as
underground lines and natural gas pipes. However, can be affected by storms, lightning,
wildlife, wildfires, wind, and falling trees. They may also sway and trip in the event of an
earthquake. They are more likely to get damaged but are the fastest to repair.
2. Underground electric lines: Not as impacted by storms, lightning, wildlife, wildfires, wind,
and falling trees but are more susceptible to liquefaction, shaking, landslides, and surface
displacement. They are less likely to be damaged than overhead lines but once damaged
take longer to repair.
3. Natural Gas lines: Like underground electric lines they are not as impacted by storms,
lightning, wildlife, wildfires, wind, and falling trees but are more susceptible to
liquefaction, shaking, landslides, and surface displacement. They are less likely to be
damaged but once damaged takes longer to repair than both overhead and underground
electric lines.
a. Newer PE and Steel materials allow lines to withstand more shaking and
movement than the older PVC lines which Palo Alto is slowly replacing.
b. Steel pipes are stronger than both PVC and PE but take 4 to 5 times lon ger to
replace/repair according to Palo Alto Utilities’ engineering team.
The Haywired report also completed a utility disruption analysis but did not complete one
specifically for Palo Alto. Therefore, the team is using San Francisco and Oakland as references.
Electricity and natural gas service restoration duration due to hypothetical 7.0 magnitude
Haywired earthquake are shown in Table F1.
47
Table F1: Projected Natural Gas and Electricity Restoration Time from Haywired Report 19
San
Francisco, CA
50%
Restoration
Tail
Restoration
Natural Gas ~ 9 days 90% at ~ 33
days
Electricity 1 day 99.5% at 30
days
Since there are no estimated restoration times for the Palo Alto electricity and natural gas
systems, the team used the data in Table F1 above as an initial approximation. Table F1 shows
restoration times for San Francisco for natural gas being 9 days to achieve 50% restoration while
electricity only takes 1 day. Table F1 shows similar timelines for Oakland. There, natural gas takes
10 days to restore to 50% while electricity only takes 2 days. These projections imply a much
faster restoration time for the electric system.
However, after digging further into the origin of these results, while the electricity restoration
data was found to be accurate, the natural gas restoration estimates were found to have some
possible inadequacies.
Those inadequacies for the report include:
1. “Though a large amount of lifeline infrastructure was assessed, the available data was
incomplete… which is particularly true for last-mile distribution infrastructure…”20
2. “Other important lifeline infrastructure (such as city gates for natural gas transmission
and distribution) … would be useful inputs but were not publicly available.”21
3. “Hazard exposure assessments pick up the presence but not performance of lifeline
infrastructure… Different types of facilities (for example above and belowground) have
different responses to the various hazards and have different design standards … and
fragility functions for different hazards may be approximated or unavailable.”22
4. “Fire was not considered in any of the Haywired scenario lifeline infrastructure damage
assessments or restoration estimates.”23
Figure F5 shows the electric power restoration curve for various counties in the Bay Area due to
the Haywired Scenario. The county of Santa Clara (which encompasses Palo Alto) could be
considered a reference for restoration time for Palo Alto, which is depicted by the orange curve.
19 SIR 2017-5013IQ: The HayWired Earthquake Scenario—Engineering Implications (usgs.gov) pg.281
20 Lifeline Infrastructure and Collocation Exposure to the HayWired Earthquake Scenario —A Summary of Hazards
and Potential Service Disruptions — SIR 2017-5013 Chapter T (usgs.gov) pg 53
21 Lifeline Infrastructure and Collocation Exposure to the HayWired Earthquake Scenario —A Summary of Hazards
and Potential Service Disruptions — SIR 2017-5013 Chapter T (usgs.gov) pg 53
22 Lifeline Infrastructure and Collocation Exposure to the HayWired Earthquake Scenario —A Summary of Hazards
and Potential Service Disruptions — SIR 2017-5013 Chapter T (usgs.gov) pg 54
23 Lifeline Infrastructure and Collocation Exposure to the HayWired Earthquake Scenario —A Summary of Hazards
and Potential Service Disruptions — SIR 2017-5013 Chapter T (usgs.gov) pg 55
Oakland, CA 50%
Restoration
Tail
Restoration
Natural Gas ~ 10 days 90% at ~ 36
days
Electricity 2 days 96% at 30
days
48
This shows 25% electricity restoration after 1 day, 50% after 2 days, 75% after 5 days, and 97%
after 30 days which matched with the San Francisco and Oakland electricity restoration results
from above.
Figure F5: Electric Power Restoration Curve for Various Counties After Haywired Earthquake24
However, from the Haywired study, there is no specific natural gas restoration data for Palo Alto
or even Santa Clara County. Since the team needed this restoration data for natural gas to
compare and contrast the electric and gas systems, this study was unable to make conclusive
comparisons between Palo Alto’s natural gas and electricity restoration times and r esiliency.
From the Haywired report: “PG&E provided a written statement that their gas transmission
model for the Haywired scenario estimates approximately 40 locations in need of repair, whereas
their gas distribution model estimates at least 2,000 gas leaks. However, PG&E also noted that
actual damage from a similar event will likely be different from what the model est imates (E.
Hickey and G. Molnar, PG&E, written commun., 2019). PG&E surmises that the majority of its gas
restoration work would be dedicated to leak surveys because the location of a repair or a leak
cannot be found without extensive leak surveys or patrols. The amount of time to assess, repair,
and restore gas service to customers would be significantly longer than that of electric power
restoration. In addition, because there would be preemptive gas shut-offs and subsequent loss
of gas service to many PG&E customers, the pilot relight effort would take many months to
24 Lifeline Infrastructure and Collocation Exposure to the HayWired Earthquake Scenario—
A Summary of Hazards and Potential Service Disruptions — SIR 2017-5013 Chapter T (usgs.gov) pg. 50
...
C
CD
u ;;;
C.
C
co
::0
~
"' > .,
CD
0
-~ .,
Cl)
Electric power restoration curve
100
75
50
25
EXPLANATION
--Alameda Co unty
--Co nlra C;osta County
--Mari n County
--Nap a Co unty
--Sa n Franc isco County
--Sa n Mateo County
--Santa Clani Coun ty
So lano County
So noma County
0 .__.____. _ _._ ...... _.,__.__,__,____.._..,__. _ _._ ...... _.._ ...... _.__.__. _ _._ ...... _.,__.__...__,____.._..,__._..._ ...... _,
0 !i 10 1,5 20 25 30
Da ys afte r ma in shock eve11t
49
complete. PG&E estimates that more than 200,000 customers could require pilot relights after
the event, not including those who proactively shut off gas to their homes and businesses and
the gas safety shut-ins performed by PG&E (E. Hickey and G. Molnar, PG&E, oral commun.,
2017).”25
Due to a lack of data, the team examined the electricity and natural gas restoration times from
past case studies. Figure F6 below shows more case studies that compare restoration times for
actual disaster events on the left and a theoretical M7.9 earthquake on the right. Figure F6 on
the left depicts electricity restoration time in blue and natural gas restoration time in red. We
can see that the electricity system restoration time is faster in all 4 of those scenarios which
include the Loma Prieta Earthquake, the Northridge Earthquake, Hurricane Katrina, and
Superstorm Sandy. Furthermore, for hurricane Katrina while electric was restored in 2 weeks,
natural gas took up to 10 years to be fully restored. The hypothetical M7.9 earthquake depicted
on the right also shows restoration times to be much faster for the electricity system than for
natural gas.
Figure F6: Natural Gas and Electricity Service Restoration for Various Scenarios26,27,28
However, it is not mentioned in Figure F6 on the left that while natural gas restoration time did
take longer in the two earthquake events, there were also fewer natural gas service losses than
electrical outages. Looking back at past data the team found that 1.4 million people initially lost
power in the Northridge Earthquake while only 120,000 people lost gas services (mostly due to
requiring relighting services). But 50% of electricity customers got power back in the first 8 hours
and power was fully restored after 3 days except for 7,500 customers, while it took 12 days to
restore service to the 120,000 natural gas customers.29
25 Lifeline Infrastructure and Collocation Exposure to the HayWired Earthquake Scenario —A Summary of Hazards
and Potential Service Disruptions — SIR 2017-5013 Chapter T (usgs.gov) Pg 49
26 SF-Guide-4-10-2020.pdf (fossilfreebuildings.org) pg. 14
27 Disaster resilience - Clean Coalition (clean-coalition.org)
28 Lifelines Interdependency Study (sfgov.org) pg. 18
29 Timeline: The 1994 Northridge Earthquake – NBC Los Angeles
5 ,0
4.5 i 40
~ 3.5
'2
f 30
i 2.5 a:
i 2,0
0 .. ,; 0 .
E
!=
10
05
o.o
Time of Power Restoration for Gas and Electric
Serv ices after Disaster Events ... ,
•Ele ctrici ty • Ga s
2.5
2.0
.. I u
.I
L~Prietiil Nt111hridgo H11rnctnP. kmnni! SUpffiloon S,ndy
E:arlhqu.ae SF/Bay Earthquuli:e Los NewOle,iins, LA NY, NJ, WV 2012
Aree1-889 A'9l~Are111!31M 2<lO<i
Disaster Event
Potential Service Restoration
Ti meframes (M7.9 Earthquake)
50
Similarly, for the Loma Prieta Earthquake 1.4 million customers initially lost power (a majority
regained power within 7 hours) and all but 12,000 customers had power within 2 days, while it
took 9 days to restore natural gas service to 150,000 customers. While there were 1,000 pipeline
leaks due to the earthquake, a majority of the restora tion time was due to customer relights.30
This shows that after an earthquake scenario while electrical outages initially affect more
customers than natural gas outages, power can be restored much faster than for natural gas
services that were lost.
Figure F6 above on the right shows that restoration is also much faster for electrical systems than
for natural gas, however that data was primarily due to modeling transmission natural gas
pipeline failure.
Another report breaks down the differences in restora tion time between natural gas and
electrical systems for various past earthquakes and defines what the main contributing factor
causing delays in restoration were. The main points from that analysis and table summary can be
found below.
Electrical: “Electrical systems recover quickly, ranging from 2 days to over 14 days for full
service disruption. They perform better than other utilities due to their high level of
redundancy and ability to bypass or reroute power. Power generating stations and
transmission lines performed well in earth quakes and received little to no damage while
substations and distribution lines have the most vulnerability and governed restoration
times for both the Northridge and Loma Prieta earthquakes.” 31
Natural Gas: “Natural restoration time were much more variable than electricity with full
restoration ranging from 7 to 84 days. Service-critical components in the natural gas
system performed well, but the major cause of disruption for most earthquakes was
relighting and re-pressuring the gas services to individual buildings.” 32
30 5. Lifeline Perspective | Practical Lessons from the Loma Prieta Earthquake | The National Academies Press
(nap.edu)
31 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326331951_REDi_Rating_System_Resilience-
based_Earthquake_Design_Initiative_for_the_Next_Generation_of_Buildings pg 57
32 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326331951_REDi_Rating_System_Resilience-
based_Earthquake_Design_Initiative_for_the_Next_Generation_of_Buildings pg 57
51
Table F2: Electricity Service Restoration Time for Various Past Events33
Table F3: Natural Gas Service Restoration Time for Various Past Events34
Another important point the team needed to consider when comparing the distribution resiliency
for the natural gas and electrical system is that Palo Alto is a much smaller utility than the ones
studied, such as PG&E and LAWDP. Palo Alto has a much smaller operating area with many
more valves for gas pipelines, allowing CPAU to reroute gas to customers without having to cut
off service to a large swathe of people, since it is easier to isolate leaks. Therefore, during gas
line breaks, fewer people will be affected by gas shutoffs when repairs are needed.
Looking into the resiliency of the gasoline system the team found that “Damage to marine
terminals, oil refineries, fuel storage tanks, fuel transmission lines, and fuel dispensaries is likely
33 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326331951_REDi_Rating_System_Resilience-
based_Earthquake_Design_Initiative_for_the_Next_Generation_of_Buildings pg 58
34 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326331951_REDi_Rating_System_Resilience-
based_Earthquake_Design_Initiative_for_the_Next_Generation_of_Buildings pg 59
:1:1,piimd• :,.1.,
RI eo PG.A.
Ll,g_"fld'a ctlon
Fo
'l!!R~
SmioDJ
Bu,1,o;q1iJ>1Ui
Tn 'illi
Liar.s
li'i.llirlb o>Jl
LUl ~s
DuntiDll 'fa
ompl c. s~l"l·lct
~1on.tl:on
.Pl'Ullary SoarH
o[Oftrill
Din11 Jl!_n
Prim&"f So-utt
11f0! nil
Disnrp . II,
l..om:i, Pritta.
U!19
IS!I
0 0 7 -0-6)1
(0 , in~ I
.J:inM
.ie\--16.e
Na Dama~
Mmor
2 , I Y!
Sm!•t.ti9ml
LamaPrf e1i1
l!lli9
--
:0-ol:'l hrid:,e
l!l!IJ
6.7
1,. 9 l
Mme
fiDol
~ .. .i.:,-....
• fiDor
i finlll
j ,h.y,
Sllll!SU!igm;l
~ 011
O< I mo
--
K!obe l.\:iip.til Ma.ule
19!15 '.1004 :?011)
ii 9 66 ll-.B
0..3 m . . ~p~imJ
~ S.,.•m,
Heflri('~l Sysrerm
lmQr .
Model-art• I -!ltirui•
!,,iodente -!iliMr
~ ~
I
-St.1ttn
II da,·, O.·,r·S Ila ·• 1 <h\'s
11imiblltia11 I . DiJtnl: . nl
liJll!itl111uto11 1
~
Darlielrli
:lOI-0
7 1
0 ,111-03~
(Urba.tl)
0,--09
(iE,,i,c.-... ,.\
S,•·•r~
Mi nor
C) Dtnur~
!,e,,-l!N,jn
"l.iqqefactiop
Zn:re•
.b .•
Dimil11,1til>ll
Darfif!ld
ll)~O
0
Cbri5ilcbunlh
:lOll
6.3
Se·•~'
i),:[<Jd=l t~
l.\fmar
~-
O\•or 14 /I;.,-~
JmmPll!ianl
ChriJ;khurc-:b.
i.OiU
0
52
in a large San Francisco Bay region earthquake. As a result, there will likely not be enough
transportation fuel supplies available after a large earthquake.” 35
Another recent 2020 study conducted by the City and County of San Francisco called the Lifelines
Restoration Performance Improvement Plan, also shows the resiliency advantages of the
electrical system over the natural gas system. This scenario is also an earthquake scenario with a
magnitude of 7.9 on the San Andreas fault and a magnitude 7.0 earthquake on the Hayward fault
(similar to the Haywired Scenario).
The City and County of San Francisco Lifelines Restoration Performance Improvement Plan had a
few important conclusions and recommendations which are extremely relevant to our study. A
few of those include:
1) Restoration of many systems can be further improved by adding backup generators or
solar panels with solar + battery storage.
2) It is recommended to reduce reliance on petroleum fuel to increase the restoration of all
systems.
a. The bay area relies on Kinder Morgan fuel pipelines and Bay Area refineries which
are more susceptible to damage and have much longer restoration times. During
a large earthquake event, transportation capabilities can be cut off to the whole
region. Therefore, utilizing solar + storage can allow for increased resiliency and
increased transportation capabilities which all lifeline sectors rely on.
3) The San Francisco Department of Building Inspection should require all new building to
be fully electric and should require the electrification of all existing buildings with gas
shutoff valves as an interim measure.
4) Generation is not seen a main issue for electrical outages. Significant damage is expected
to happen to underground transmission and distribution lines in San Francisco as well as
to the telecom equipment which is responsible with communicating with those devices.
Above ground lines may also be damaged by falling debris. Substations have been recently
upgraded to withstand earthquake damage.
5) The full restoration of the natural gas system can take up to 6 months because of the time
it will take to integrity test the lines prior to depressurizing and number of qualified
personnel required to relight pilot lights.
6) Natural gas is primarily dependent on electric power and communications for remote
operation of gas shutoff valves and is also critically dependent on the road network to
access manual gas shutoff valves and repair damaged pipes.
a. However, the vast majority of gas regulation and control equipment are not
affected by power outages as they are mechanical devices that are powered by
pressure in the gas system.36
35 G. Schremp, California Energy Commission, written commun., 2018
36 70_Lifelines-Report_1020.indd (onesanfrancisco.org)
53
Furthermore, when comparing gas and electric transmission coming into the city, CPAU is again
different from those larger utilities. Palo Alto has 4 connection points or (Gas Gates) and two
separate gas transmission pipelines from PG&E (8-12” steel pipes) coming into the city. Since
there are 4 connection points and 2 pipes from PG&E, a single point of failure is less likely to
cause natural gas shutoffs for the city. In comparison Palo Alto has 3 electricity transmission lines,
which all pass through one corridor. Therefore, if there is a disaster event in that one location, all
of Palo Alto’s power supply is vulnerable. A past airplane crash incident in that corridor hit all
three transmission lines and took out power to the whole city back in 2010.
Transmission line loss into Palo Alto is still a major issue that could cause a power outage to all
of Palo Alto from 12 hours to 3 days. The City is working to add a second transmission line to
prevent these issues. Until then, this type of outage would not directly affect the natural gas
system so mixed energy use homes would fare better (except for fully electrified homes with
ample solar + storage). Since this is a localized incident, residents could dr ive out of the city to
refill their gas, buy groceries, food, and medical supplies as needed.
Palo Alto’s Engineering team believes that cybersecurity is a large threat to consider as cities
electrify and decarbonize their buildings. This is because cybe rattacks can affect whole regions
potentially taking down all of the WECC grid from weeks to months. Furthermore, electric grids
are much more vulnerable to cybersecurity issues than water and natural gas systems. This is
because electrical systems have many more automated and computerized components than
their water and natural gas counterparts. Furthermore, if water or natural gas systems are
hacked, these physical resources allow backup storage and other means to retrieve the
resources. Whereas with the electrical grid, a targeted cyberattack might not just take out power
but also cause cascading failures, destroying many key components of the grid including
substations, wires, and transformers. Since water and natural gas pipelines can’t have cascading
failures, they can be repaired much faster after a cyberattack than the electric grid.
A cyberattack scenario would be similar to a transmission line loss scenario for Palo Alto except
that the cyberattack scenario can affect much larger grid systems (pot entially shutting down all
of the WECC). The gas distribution will most likely not be affected. The much longer power outage
duration and larger area affected means people would no longer be able to simply leave Palo
Alto to buy food, gasoline, or access WIFI since the whole grid will be down. While mixed energy
use home would fair slightly better in this scenario due to having a working stove and water
heater, they would face the same issues as fully electrified homes in terms of space heating,
cooling, transportation, and WIFI.
54
REFFERENCES
1. Resilience Metrics for the Electric Power System: A Performance-Based Approach (comacloud.net)
2. U.S. EPA. Integrated Science Assessment (ISA) for Oxides of Nitrogen – Health Criteria (Final Report, Jan 2016).
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC, EPA/600/R-15/068, 2016.
https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/isa/recordisplay.cfm?deid=310879, link retrieved September 3, 2021.
3. 2019 California Residential Appliance Saturation Study - Executive Summary pg 3, 9
4. G. Schremp, California Energy Commission, written commun., 2018
5. 70_Lifelines-Report_1020.indd (onesanfrancisco.org)
6. U.S. EPA. Integrated Science Assessment (ISA) for Oxides of Nitrogen – Health Criteria (Final Report, Jan 2016).
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC, EPA/600/R-15/068, 2016.
https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/isa/recordisplay.cfm?deid=310879, link retrieved September 3, 2021.
7. SF-Guide-4-10-2020.pdf (fossilfreebuildings.org) pg. 44
8. SF-Guide-4-10-2020.pdf (fossilfreebuildings.org) pg. 46
9. City and County of San Francisco Lifelines Council, Lifelines Interdependency Study Report, April 17, 2014
https://sfgov.org/sfc/sites/default/files/ESIP/Documents/homepage/LifelineCouncil%20Interdependency%20Stud
y_FINAL.pdf
10. SF-Guide-4-10-2020.pdf (fossilfreebuildings.org) pg. 49
11. 2019 California Residential Appliance Saturation Study - Executive Summary
12. 2019 California Residential Appliance Saturation Study - Project Overview pg. 14
13. What Happens If You Have Solar And The Power Goes Out? (solarreviews.com)
14. Enhancing the Security of the North American Electric Grid (cbo.gov) pg. 9
15. SIR 2017-5013 v1.2: The HayWired Earthquake Scenario—Earthquake Hazards (usgs.gov) pg. 32
16. Local Hazard Mitigation Plan – City of Palo Alto, CA
17. SIR 2017-5013 v1.2: The HayWired Earthquake Scenario—Earthquake Hazards (usgs.gov)
18. SIR 2017-5013 v1.2: The HayWired Earthquake Scenario—Earthquake Hazards (usgs.gov) pg 23
19. SIR 2017-5013IQ: The HayWired Earthquake Scenario—Engineering Implications (usgs.gov) pg.281
20. Lifeline Infrastructure and Collocation Exposure to the HayWired Earthquake Scenario —A Summary of Hazards
and Potential Service Disruptions — SIR 2017-5013 Chapter T (usgs.gov) pg 53
21. Lifeline Infrastructure and Collocation Exposure to the HayWired Earthquake Scenario —A Summary of Hazards
and Potential Service Disruptions — SIR 2017-5013 Chapter T (usgs.gov) pg 53
22. Lifeline Infrastructure and Collocation Exposure to the HayWired Earthquake Scenario —A Summary of Hazards
and Potential Service Disruptions — SIR 2017-5013 Chapter T (usgs.gov) pg 54
23. Lifeline Infrastructure and Collocation Exposure to the HayWired Earthquake Scenario —A Summary of Hazards
and Potential Service Disruptions — SIR 2017-5013 Chapter T (usgs.gov) pg 55
24. Lifeline Infrastructure and Collocation Exposure to the HayWired Earthquake Scenario—
A Summary of Hazards and Potential Service Disruptions — SIR 2017-5013 Chapter T (usgs.gov) pg. 50
25. Lifeline Infrastructure and Collocation Exposure to the HayWired Earthquake Scenario —A Summary of Hazards
and Potential Service Disruptions — SIR 2017-5013 Chapter T (usgs.gov) Pg 49
26. SF-Guide-4-10-2020.pdf (fossilfreebuildings.org) pg. 14
27. Disaster resilience - Clean Coalition (clean-coalition.org)
28. Lifelines Interdependency Study (sfgov.org) pg. 18
29. Timeline: The 1994 Northridge Earthquake – NBC Los Angeles
30. 5. Lifeline Perspective | Practical Lessons from the Loma Prieta Earthquake | The National Academies Press
(nap.edu)
31.https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326331951_REDi_Rating_System_Resilience-
based_Earthquake_Design_Initiative_for_the_Next_Generation_of_Buildings pg 57
32.https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326331951_REDi_Rating_System_Resilience-
based_Earthquake_Design_Initiative_for_the_Next_Generation_of_Buildings pg 57
33.https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326331951_REDi_Rating_System_Resilience-
based_Earthquake_Design_Initiative_for_the_Next_Generation_of_Buildings pg 58
55
34.https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326331951_REDi_Rating_System_Resilience-
based_Earthquake_Design_Initiative_for_the_Next_Generation_of_Buildings pg 59
35. G. Schremp, California Energy Commission, written commun., 2018
36. 70_Lifelines-Report_1020.indd (onesanfrancisco.org)
November 3, 2021 www.cityofpaloalto.org
Impact of Decarbonization on the Resiliency of Single-Family Homes in Palo Alto
Shoja Jahangard
Staff: Shiva Swaminathan
.CITY OF
-PALO ALTO
2
Overview
Background
Project Objective
Framework for Study
Results
Disaster Scenarios Investigated
Energy Services in Mixed-Fuel and All-Electric Single Family in Disaster Scenarios
Resiliency Measures for Utilities and Homeowners
Key Takeaways
Questions & Feedback
• CITY OF
PALO
ALTO
3
Palo Alto’s Sustainability and Climate Action Plan (S/CAP)
Achieving 80% GHG reduction by 2030 goal will require
large changes in energy use for buildings and vehicles,
including:
Background
1.Reduce GHG emissions and energy consumption in
buildings through energy efficiency and design
2.Reduce natural gas use in buildings through
electrification
3.Electrifying the residential vehicle fleet
Figure 1. Seven proposed priorities for S/CAP
1. 2020-sustainability-and-climate-action-plan-updated-potential-goals-and-key-actions-draft.pdf (cityofpaloalto.org)• . .
CITY OF
PALO
ALTO
ENERGY
CLIMATE
ADAPTATION &
SEA LEVEL RISE
MOBILITY
WATER
ZERO WASTE
ELECTRIC
VEHICLES
NATURAL
ENVIRONMENT
4
Project Objective:
Resiliency Consequences of Single-Family Homes Going All-Electric
To assess the resiliency consequences (positive
and negative) of fully electrifying single family
residential (SFR) homes in Palo Alto, and any
additional vulnerabilities caused from switching
from multiple fuel sources to a single source
Figure 1. Seven proposed priorities for S/CAP.• .
CITY OF
PALO
ALTO
ENERG"i
5
Framework for Analysis
Assess resiliency of electricity, natural gas, & gasoline systems
Choose and evaluate 3 major disaster and or outage scenarios
Assess existing mixed-fuel home resiliency in outage scenarios
Assess resiliency of all-electric homes in 3 outage scenarios
Investigate options for all-electric homes which are more
resilient than existing homes for the 3 scenarios• .
CITY OF
PALO
ALTO
26
Resiliency of Electricity, Natural Gas, & Gasoline Infrastructure
Electricity Natural Gas Gasoline
•Above ground wires
disrupted by weather,
treefalls, branches, etc…
•More damage to above
ground wires, fewer
underground, underground
damage takes longer to fix
•Palo Alto currently fed by
single corridor of electricity
transmission lines (second
corridor planned)
•Looped system very robust
•Transmission pumps largely
powered by own natural gas
•Leak checking and pilot
relights require significant
time after disruptions
•Palo Alto system fed by
multiple interconnections to
PG&E
•Distribution system requires
electricity to operate
•Gasoline systems rely on
electricity to operate
•Gas stations use electric
pumps to pull gasoline out of
underground storage tanks
•Most gas stations refilled
daily
•Most gas stations in CA do
not have back-up generators
for pumping gas
•FL, NY, and LA mandate
backup generators at gas
stations due to events such
as Superstorm Sandy and
Hurricane Katrina
• CITY OF
PALO
ALTO
13
3 Disaster and/or Outage Scenarios Chosen and Investigated
Scenario 1:
Major Earthquake
Scenario 2:
Palo Alto Only Power Outage
Scenario 3:
Cyberattack-Western US Electric Out
•USGS “Haywired” Earthquake
•Widespread (≈80%) damage to
electricity, 70% fixed in 72 hours
•Limited (≈5%) damage to natural
gas, 50% recovered in 9-11 days
•Natural Gas distribution system
leak-checked & pilots relighted
•Gas stations need power to work
•Similar to 2010 plane crash
•Only Palo Alto without electricity
•1 –3 days electricity fully restored
•Natural gas & gasoline systems
intact inside and outside of Palo
Alto
•Cyberattack cripples electric grid
in Western US
•Electric grid could take weeks to
fully restore
•Natural gas & gasoline systems
impacted to some extent
• .
CITY OF
PALO
ALTO
12
Current Resiliency of Mixed-Fuel vs. All-Electric Single Family Homes:
Most natural gas appliances require electricity to run
•Of natural gas appliances, only stoves and gas tank water heaters work
when power is out
•Natural gas furnaces (forced air), radiant floor heat, instant water
heaters, ovens, clothes dryers, and pool heaters all require electricity
•Stoves would require ignition by hand, and operating without
ventilation is not healthy
•Electric water heaters with tanks, either heat-pumps or standard, will
provide 1-2 days of hot water from tank
•For a 24-hour electric-only outage affecting only Palo Alto (Scenario 2),
differences in service between mixed-fuel and all-electric single-family
home (without back-up):
•All-electric stove will not function, whereas gas stove will
•All-electric home will have 50%-100% hot water needs met, whereas
a natural gas water heater with tank will meet 100% of needs
• .
CITY OF
PALO
ALTO
11
Impact levels:
None:Services not impacted during event.
Low:Services little impacted from event and
requires relatively small behavior changes.
Moderate:Services moderately
impacted from event requires larger
behavior modifications.
High:Services majorly impacted from event,
including major inconveniences causing
delays in productiveness, monetary loss, or
difficulty in utilizing appliances that are
necessary to support everyday needs.
Extremely High:Services extremely
impacted during event This would include
life threatening situations and prolonged
lack of access to everyday needs.
Impact characterization:
The levels of impact characterization were
defined by three key factors:
1.Importance in meeting customer’s basic
life needs
2.Duration, extent, and severity
of disruption for electricity, natural
gas,and gasoline systems
3.Ability of device to buffer impact or to
self-sustain for period of time
Energy for Home, Car &
Back-up Power Fuel
Energy
Service
Scenario 1:
Major
Earthquake
(Haywired)
Scenario 2:
Palo Alto Only
Electric Outage
(Plane Crash)
Scenario 3:
Western US
Electric Outage
(Cyberattack)
A.Current Mixed-Fuel
•Mixed-Fuel Home
•Gasoline Car
•No Back-Up
Nat Gas Heating
Electric Cooling
Gasoline Car
Nat Gas/Elec Cooking
Nat Gas Hot-water
B.Current All-Electric
•All-Electric Home
•Electric Car
•No Back-Up
Electric Heating
Electric Cooling
Electric Car
Electric Cooking
Electric Hot-water
C.All-Electric with
Solar+Storage
•All-Electric Home
•Electric Car
•Back-up: 7.6kW Solar &
13.5kWh Battery
Electric Heating
Electric Cooling
Electric Car
Electric Cooking
Electric Hot-water
Solar+Storage Generator
D. All-Electric with
Natural Gas Generator
•All-Electric Home
•Electric Car
•Back-up: Whole-House
Natural Gas Generator
Electric Heating
Electric Cooling
Electric Car
Electric Cooking
Electric Hot-water
Natural Gas Generator
-•
11
Energy for Home, Car &
Back-up Power Fuel
Energy
Service
Average
Impact on
Service
A.Current Mixed-Fuel
•Mixed-Fuel Home
•Gasoline Car
•No Back-Up
Nat Gas Heating
Electric Cooling
Gasoline Car
Nat Gas/Elec Cooking
Nat Gas Hot-water
B.Current All-Electric
•All-Electric Home
•Electric Car
•No Back-Up
Electric Heating
Electric Cooling
Electric Car
Electric Cooking
Electric Hot-water
C.All-Electric with
Solar & Storage
•All-Electric Home
•Electric Car
•Back-up: 7.6kW Solar &
13.5kWh Battery
Electric Heating
Electric Cooling
Electric Car
Electric Cooking
Electric Hot-water
Solar+Storage Generator
D. All-Electric with
Natural Gas Generator
•All-Electric Home
•Electric Car
•Back-up: Whole-House
Natural Gas Generator
Electric Heating
Electric Cooling
Electric Car
Electric Cooking
Electric Hot-water
Natural Gas Generator
Impact levels:
None:Services not impacted during event.
Low:Services little impacted from event and
requires relatively small behavior changes.
Moderate:Services moderately
impacted from event requires larger
behavior modifications.
High:Services majorly impacted from event,
including major inconveniences causing
delays in productiveness, monetary loss, or
difficulty in utilizing appliances that are
necessary to support everyday needs.
Extremely High:Services extremely
impacted during event This would include
life threatening situations and prolonged
lack of access to everyday needs.
Impact characterization:
The levels of impact characterization were
defined by three key factors:
1.Importance in meeting customer’s basic
life needs
2.Duration, extent, and severity
of disruption for electricity, natural
gas,and gasoline systems
3.Ability of device to buffer impact or to
self-sustain for period of time
Key Takeaways:
•Even with 2 of 3 disasters primarily in electric
system, there are very similar energy service
impacts to mixed fuel and all-electric homes
•This is largely due to most natural gas appliances
and all gasoline stations requiring electricity to
function
-•
-
11
Energy for Home, Car &
Back-up Power Fuel
Energy
Service
Average
Impact on
Service
A.Current Mixed-Fuel
•Mixed-Fuel Home
•Gasoline Car
•No Back-Up
Nat Gas Heating
Electric Cooling
Gasoline Car
Nat Gas/Elec Cooking
Nat Gas Hot-water
B.Current All-Electric
•All-Electric Home
•Electric Car
•No Back-Up
Electric Heating
Electric Cooling
Electric Car
Electric Cooking
Electric Hot-water
C.All-Electric with
Solar & Storage
•All-Electric Home
•Electric Car
•Back-up: 7.6kW Solar &
13.5kWh Battery
Electric Heating
Electric Cooling
Electric Car
Electric Cooking
Electric Hot-water
Solar+Storage Generator
D. All-Electric with
Natural Gas Generator
•All-Electric Home
•Electric Car
•Back-up: Whole-House
Natural Gas Generator
Electric Heating
Electric Cooling
Electric Car
Electric Cooking
Electric Hot-water
Natural Gas Generator
Impact levels:
None:Services not impacted during event.
Low:Services little impacted from event and
requires relatively small behavior changes.
Moderate:Services moderately
impacted from event requires larger
behavior modifications.
High:Services majorly impacted from event,
including major inconveniences causing
delays in productiveness, monetary loss, or
difficulty in utilizing appliances that are
necessary to support everyday needs.
Extremely High:Services extremely
impacted during event This would include
life threatening situations and prolonged
lack of access to everyday needs.
Impact characterization:
The levels of impact characterization were
defined by three key factors:
1.Importance in meeting customer’s basic
life needs
2.Duration, extent, and severity
of disruption for electricity, natural
gas,and gasoline systems
3.Ability of device to buffer impact or to
self-sustain for period of time
For single-family, similar
resiliency in current
mixed-fuel & all-electric
Longer restoration time for
natural gas distribution
system after earthquake
leads to these differences
-•
-
29
Homeowner Options to Increase SFR Resiliency
Electricity Resiliency Measures
•Rooftop solar and storage, wired to island
•Mobile power stations (run electric space heaters)
•Propane, gasoline, and natural gas backup generators
•Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) for medical equipment
•Vehicle to home-powering your home in emergency
•Smart Control Panels-automatically prioritize in outage
Other Resiliency Measures
•Building insulation & higher-efficiency appliances
•Propane/charcoal grills
•Air drying clothes
•Biking & e-bikes as lower energy alternatives
•Emergency kit & coordination
• ,
.
CITY OF
PALO
ALTO
28
CPAU has several initiatives underway to improve resiliency
CPAU Resiliency Initiatives
1.Adding a second set of electric transmission lines into the city
2.Undergrounding line to Palo Alto Foothills
3.Additional 2021 contract to catch up on electric distribution maintenance
4.Undergrounding overhead electric distribution lines
5.Replacing PVC gas pipes with PE pipes
• .
CITY OF
PALO
ALTO
34
1.Of natural gas appliances, only stoves and gas tank water heaters work when power is out
•Natural gas furnaces (forced air), radiant floor heat, instant water heaters, ovens, clothes dryers, and pool
heaters all require electricity
•Stoves would require ignition by hand, and operating without ventilation is not healthy
•Electric water heaters with tanks, either heat-pumps or standard, will provide 1-2 days of hot water
•In earthquakes, electric systems tend to experience more widespread disruption but tend to recover faster
(70% recovered by 24-72 hours) than natural gas where moderate disruptions are expected for ≈2 weeks
2.All-electric home resiliency could be enhanced with a wide-array of products
•Simple and low-cost products such as small battery packs or propane/gasoline electric generators, outdoor
propane ranges, or EV to home which could become prevalent in the future
•Higher cost solutions: Solar + storage systems or whole-house natural gas generators
Key Takeaways: Resiliency Enhancements for All-Electric Single Family
• .
CITY OF
PALO
ALTO
34
Continued:
Key Takeaways: Resiliency Enhancements for All-Electric Single Family
3.The resiliency of EVs is equal or better than gasoline cars in major disaster scenarios evaluated
•Range of EVs are currently similar to gasoline cars; the level of fuel in the car can be similar for both
•Gas stations cannot function in the event of an electrical outage and do not have backup generators
•EVs at home could be charged with a solar PV system
4.A 7.6 kW solar PV system and 13.5 kWh battery is enough to generally meet most the energy needs of an
all-electric home and EV during a 24-hour power outage March through October
•A larger solar PV system and or better insulated home will be needed to meet the majority of the needs for
November, December, January, and February.
• .
CITY OF
PALO
ALTO
Questions and Feedback
References
[1] 2020-sustainability-and-climate-action-plan-updated-potential-goals-and-key -actions-draft.pdf (cityofpaloalto.org)
[2]2019 California Residential Appliance Saturation Study -Executive Summary
[3]HayWired Scenario (usgs.gov)
[4] Local Hazard Mitigation Plan –City of Palo Alto, CA
[5] SIR 2017-5013IQ: The HayWired Earthquake Scenario—Engineering Implications (usgs.gov)pg.281
[6] Lifeline Infrastructure and Collocation Exposure to the HayWired Earthquake Scenario—A Summary of Hazards and Potential
Service Disruptions —SIR 2017-5013 Chapter T (usgs.gov)pg. 50
[7] SF-Guide-4-10-2020.pdf (fossilfreebuildings.org)pg. 14
[8]Disaster resilience -Clean Coalition (clean-coalition.org)
[9] Lifelines Interdependency Study (sfgov.org)pg. 18
[10] 70_Lifelines-Report_1020.indd (onesanfrancisco.org)pg. 24
Draft for Input and Feedback
• .
CITY OF
PALO
ALTO
21
San Francisco Lifeline Study–Utility Restoration Timeline
Draft for Input and Feedback
10. 70_Lifelines-Report_1020.indd (onesanfrancisco.org)pg. 24
FIGUIRE 2 ~ S U . MARY ~ESTO RATm . T I MEII...I NES
IHil"I:
Flre
• .
CITY OF
PALO
ALTO
OfiJ,ln
P lk:Wo
S FP llG
R«o
o1~Fr,m: c.o
SFO
SFP G
T e serv ice d isr u,pt · leve ls a r e de fi ned as: S Efflm:::E □I S i;tUP T I CJN l!..E'ri'EJL!i
• Seve r e = d is r uptio wii h igh spatia l extent &
lh "g impact d isnr t · s.
• Moderd't.e = dis.1up · s !1,U h Im spat "al exten t &
lh "g impact O R h "g spa t i ext.e · & b 'ii\' i pact ~
• Lo'iiv = dfSJ I p t" s wj t h I m spatial ex en t a 1low
ac t
• . o d1srup i on
Wher e.
• Ex te t = spat ial re·
t at ar e a ected.
• Impact = sever it~ o conse ueoces and the d ration of ihe 1srupt io n.. FOi
t i ... ,
exam • c:omp le e loss o f water SLip\l]ly is tii.§h i ac t lii ndepende o ow m n
peop le are allfect e ai " e reas a water advj sory · ~ow i pac t
Shoja Jahangard
Stanford Shultz and Karl Knapp Energy Fellow
Shoja.Jahangard@CityofPaloAlto.org
(818) 521-6082
CITY OF
PALO
ALTO